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SURVEILLANCE, SECRECY, AND THE 
SEARCH FOR MEANINGFUL 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
SUDHA SETTY* 
One of the most intractable problems in the debate around maintaining 
the rule of law while combating the threat of terrorism is the question of 
secrecy and transparency. In peacetime, important tenets to the rule of law 
include transparency of the lmv, limits on government power, and consistency 
of the law as applied to individuals in the polity. Yet the post-9/11 decision-
maldng by the Bush and Obama administrations has been characterized by 
excessive secrecy that stymies most efforts to hold the government 
accountable for its abuses. Executive branch policy with regard to detention, 
interrogation, targeted ldlling, and surveillance are kept secret, and that 
secrecy has been largely validated by a compliant judicial)l that has 
dismissed almost all suits challenging human and civil rights abuses resulting 
fi'Oln counterterrorism programs. Efforts by Congress to engage in 
meaning/it! oversight have met with mixed results; in the area of government 
surveillance, such efforts have been fi·uitless without the benefit of leaked 
information on warrantless surveillance by government insiders. The 
executive branch has generally refiised to make public vital aspects of its 
surveillance programs in ways that could give oversight efforts more muscle. 
At the same time, the executive branch has consistently defended the legality 
and efficacy of these surveillance programs. 
This paper considers the nature and effect of the warrantless surveillance 
infi-astructure constructed in the United States since the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, and discusses surveillance-related powers and 
accountability measures in the United Kingdom and India as comparative 
examples. Through this analysis, this paper questions whether accountability 
over government abuses in this area exist in an effective fonn, or if 
governments have constructed a post-9/11 legal architecture with regard to 
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sun1eillance that engenders excessive secrecy and renders accountability 
mechanisms largely meaningless. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What does it mean to maintain the mle of law, particularly when national 
security and counterterrorism policies are at issue? In its propagation of the "global 
war on terror" after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush 
Administration was accused many times of behaving in a lawless fashion. 1 
President Obama picked up on this theme, insisting early on that his administration 
would oversee a return to the primacy of the mle of law, regardless of whether the 
country viewed itself as being at peace or at war. 2 In doing so, Obama promised to 
restore the idea that the government should have limited power, should be held to 
account for its transgressions, and that the government's actions and the laws under 
which it acts ought to be transparent. 3 
Yet the post-9/11 decision-making by both the Bush and Obama 
administrations has been characterized by excessive secrecy that stymies most 
effmis to hold the government accountable for its abuses. Pmticularly in the area of 
govemment surveillance, meaningful oversight has seemed impossible without the 
trigger of leaked information. The executive branch has consistently defended the 
legality and efficacy of these surveillance programs, insisting that the 
administration acts in accordance with the mle of law and that secrecy has been 
necessaty, and that leaks by govemment insiders have been criminal and 
counterproductive. 4 Congress has enabled the executive branch to engage in 
widespread surveillance in the post-9/11 context and has not been able to compel 
the executive branch to make available information regarding its surveillance 
programs that could give any oversight effotis more muscle. 
This paper considers the nature and effect of national security-related 
surveillance and accountability measures consttucted in the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and India since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In 
doing so, this paper questions whether accountability of government abuses in this 
area exist in a meaningful form, or if governments have coristmcted a post-9/11 
legal architecture with regard to surveillance that engenders excessive secrecy in 
1 The Bush Administration's common response was that its practices and policies indeed 
compmied with the law-its interpretation of the law. See, e.g., Memorandum from the U.S. Dep't of 
Justice Office of Legal Counsel to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct 
for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. I, 2002) [hereinafter Bybee Memorandum] 
(defining "torture" narrowly for purposes of shielding U.S. interrogators from liability under 
international and domestic law). The administration likewise made efforts to amend the law to compmi 
with its chosen path of action. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Interrogation Methods Rejected by MililmJ' Win 
Bush's Support, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/08/washington/08legal.html?pagewanted=all&_r=O (discussing ways 
in which the Bush administration sought to redefine lawlessness after adverse judicial decisions). 
2 See Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Nat'l Sec. (May 21, 2009) [hereinafter 2009 
National Archives Speech], http://www. whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-nationa1-
security-5-21-09. 
3 See Diane P. Wood, The Rule of Law in Times of Stress, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 455 (2003) 
(defining one aspect of the rule of law as providing meaningful government constraint and 
accountability). 
4 See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence (Jan. 
17, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/20 14/01/17 /remarks-president-review-signals-
intelligence (defending the legality and efficacy of NSA warrantless surveillance); David E. Sanger & 
John O'Neil, White House Begins New Effort to Defend Surveillance Program, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/23/politics/23cnd-wiretap.htrnl?pagewanted=all&_r=O. 
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ways that render accountability mechanisms largely ersatz. Part I considers post-
9/11 surveillance effmis in the United States and the legal architecture that has 
supported it. Part II questions whether the laws governing surveillance should 
legitimately be considered accountability mechanisms, or whether they instead 
mimic the rnle of law by becoming relevant only when leaked information becomes 
available. Part III uses a comparative lens to consider the systems of surveillance 
adopted by the United Kingdom and India-other democratic nations strnggling 
with security threats-and the efficacy of the accountability mechanisms in those 
nations. Part N concludes with an exploration of possible avenues for the 
limitation of and accountability over government surveillance. 
I. THE LEGAL ARCHITECTURE OF U.S. SURVEILLANCE EFFORTS 
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. surveillance efforts 
were ramped up, in part due to the perception that intelligence agencies failed to 
garner vital information that could have prevented the attacks. 5 There was 
significant disagreement as to whether the failure was due primarily to legal 
constraints6 or primarily to an inability to synthesize and analyze the available 
intelligence accurately and thoroughly. 7 The 9/11 Commission agreed with the 
latter view, concluding that the inability of intelligence agencies to learn about and 
prevent the attacks of September 11 was not attributable to a lack of legal 
authority. 8 Nonetheless, the legal and policy constraints on intelligence gathering 
were loosened significantly in the wake of the September 11 attacks. As discussed 
below, the PATRIOT Act arguably authorized the collection and storage of 
domestic telephony and internet metadata9 and the collection and content searches 
5 See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, FINAL 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 339-{50 
(2004), available at http://www.9- I I commission.gov [hereinafter 9/11 Commission Report] (discussing 
the inability of U.S. intelligence agencies to synthesize relevant data prior to the September lith 
attacks). 
6 See Testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft Before the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States 2 (Apr. 13, 2004), 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/hearings/hearingl 0/ashcroft_statement.pdf (noting that "[t]he single 
greatest structural cause for September II was the wall that segregated criminal investigators and 
intelligence agents. Government erected this wall. Government buttressed this wall. And before 
September II, government was blinded by this wall"). 
7 See Testimony of Professor Stephen J. Schulhofer Before the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States I (Dec. 8, 2003), available at 
http:// govinfo.library. unt.edu/911/hearings/hearing6/witness_schulhofer .htm (noting that intelligence 
"capabilities are largely determined by non-legal constraints-technical, budgetary and human 
resources, the training and priorities of our officers and the organization and cultures of the relevant 
agencies-all areas where our deficits have been, and continue to be, enormous"). 
8 See 9/11 Commission Report, supra note 5, at 339-{50. 
9 The telephony metadata authorized for collection is defined as: 
[I]nclud[ing] comprehensive communications routing information, including but not limited to 
session identifYing information (e.g., originating and terminating telephone number, International 
Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number, International Mobile station [sic] Equipment Identity 
(IMEI) number, etc.), hunk identifier, telephone calling card numbers, and time and duration of 
call. Telephony metadata does not include the substantive content of any commtmication ... or 
the name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer. 
See In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation 3 n.l (FISA Ct. 2013), 
http://www .dni .gov/files/ documents/PrimaryOrder_ Collection_215 .pdf. 
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of substantial amounts of foreign telephone and internet communications, 10 thereby 
giving the intelligence community a much larger "haystack" of information from 
which to attempt to glean details of emerging and ongoing terrorist tlu·eats. 11 This 
shift generated critiques from civil libertarians and lawmakers, 12 but critics have 
been largely unable to secure significant and lasting victories in curtailing 
surveillance powers, either tlu·ough judicial action 13 or legislative initiative. 
However, the tenor of the public debate became more contentious in June 
2013, when then-National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden 
began revealing classified documents detailing the scope of NSA surveillance on 
foreign and U.S. persons in order to prompt public scrutiny and debate over the 
programs. Snowden revealed, among many other things, that the NSA was engaged 
in the practice of collecting and retaining the metadata of all U.S. telephone 
customers for five years (the "NSA Metadata Program"), and had been running 
searches through that metadata when there was a "reasonable, articulable suspicion" 
that a particular telephone number was associated with potential terrorist activity. 14 · 
This program-with its broad scope, lack of pa1iicularized suspicion, and 
lengthy duration of data retention-provides a useful vehicle tlu·ough which to 
analyze the question of meaningful accountability over warrantless government 
surveillance more generally. 15 Snowden's revelations over the year following the 
publication of his initial disclosure continued to foster debate and demands for 
10 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. I 07-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 287 [hereinafter PATRIOT 
Act] (arguably authorizing the collection and storage of bulk metadata); id. § 702 (authorizing the 
targeted collection of data, including content, from overseas targets). When various provisions of the 
Patriot Act were up for renewal in 2010, debates on the utility, invasiveness, and potential abuse of the 
surveillance provisions ended in congressional reauthorization of the Act .without alternation. See 
David Kravets, Lawmakers Punt Patriot Act to Obama, WIRED (Feb. 26, 2010), 
http://www.wired.com/2010/02/la\vmakers-renew-patriot-act/. 
11 See Gil Press, The Effectiveness of Smail vs. Big Data Is Where the NSA Debate Should Start, 
FORBES (June 12, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/20 13/06/12/the-effectiveness-of-small-
vs-big-data-is-where-the-nsa-debate-should-start/ (discussing need to understand whether a larger or 
smaller "haystack" of data better enables intelligence-gathering and analysis efforts). 
12 See, e.g., Felicia Sonmez, Harry Reid, Rand Paul Spar over Patriot Act on Senate Floor, 
WASH. PosT (May 25, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/post/hany-reid-rand-
paul-spar-over-patriot-act-on-senate-floor/20 11/05/25/ AGcgWRBH_blog.html (describing objections 
by Senators Rand Paul and Tom Udall to data-gathering provisions being debated for renewal as part of 
the Patriot Act). 
13 E.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) (holding that plaintiffs alleging 
unconstitutional and illegal surveillance lacked standing to bring their complaint because they had no 
publicly available proof of their surveillance). Cases that challenge these surveillance programs on 
constitutional and statutory grounds are still being litigated. See infra Part I.C.2 ("Atiicle III Courts"). 
14 See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, 
GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-
court -order. 
15 Of course, the U.S. intelligence community has engaged in numerous programs involving 
warrantless surveillance, and this paper only addresses the bulk metadata collection that is arguably 
authorized under Section 215 of the Pattiot Act. Other warrantless surveillance-of non-U.S. persons 
or on non-U.S. tetTitmy-falls under the auspices of other authorities, such as Executive Order 12333 
or Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Those surveillance and data collection 
efforts are beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, the structural accountability questions raised 
with regard to the NSA Metadata Program can be extrapolated to consider other domestic surveillance 
questions because of analogous legal and political frameworks. 
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better oversight of the NSA. 16 The administration initiated various review 
mechanisms, 17 Congress convened oversight hearings, 18 and the public engaged in a 
vigorous debate as to the legality, efficacy, and morality of the NSA's activities, 
particularly the bulle collection and retention for several years of telephony and 
internet metadata of U.S. persons. 
This collection has been described at times as lawless, 19 yet the architecture 
constructed to support arguments as to the domestic legality20 and constitutionality 
of the NSA Meta data Program is extensive. On a purely constitutional level, some 
have asserted that inherent Article II power confers on the executive branch 
expansive surveillance powers based on a view that the United States continues to 
be on a post-9/11 war footing. 21 From a legislative perspective, a significant 
number of statutes, such as the Authorization for the Use of Military Force 
16 See James Ball & Spencer Ackennan, NSA Loophole Allows Warmntless Search for U.S. 
Citizens' Emails and Phone Calls, GUARDIAN (Aug. 9, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/nsa-loophole-warrantless-searches-email-calls; 
Michael Birnbaum & Ellen Nakashima, German Leader Calls Obama About Alleged Cellphone 
Tapping, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/german-leader-calls-
obama-about-alleged-cellphone-tapping/20 13/1 0/23/2edb4aa2-3cl 0-11 e3-b0e7-
716179a2c2c7_story.html; James Risen & Laura Poitras, N.S.A. Gathers Data on Social Connections of 
U.S. Citizens, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2013) http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/us/nsa-examines-
social-networks-of-us-citizens.html?pagewanted=all. 
17 See inji·a, Part II.A. 
18 See infra, Part II.B. 
19 E.g., Glenn Greenwald, An Ideology of Lawlessness, UNCLAIMED TERRITORY (Jan. 6, 2006 
9:07 AM), http://glenngreenwald.blogspot.com/2006/0 1/ideology-of-lawlessness.html (describing the 
Bush administration's telecommunications surveillance and data collection as indicative of the 
administration's general lawlessness with regard to its countetierrorism operations); Tori Mends-Cole, 
Waterboarding Redux: Anthony Romero Takes on Yoo, Gonzales over Bush-Era "Lawlessness", 
ACLU (Aug. 3, 2011 9:07 AM), https://www.aclu.oi·glblog/human-rights-national-
security/waterboarding-redux-anthony-romero-takes-yoo-gonzales-over-bush (discussing Bush-era 
detainee interrogation as "lawless"). 
20 There are ongoing questions as to whether the practice of mass data collection, storage and 
mining by governments violates international legal standards, such as those articulated in the 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, U.N. Doc. 
A/69/397 (Sept. 23, 2014). The question of the NSA's intemational law compliance is beyond the 
scope ofthis project. 
21 In re Nat'! Sec. Agency Telecommunications Records Litig., 564 F. Supp. 2d II 09, 1116-17 
(N.D. Cal. 2008) (describing the legality of NSA collection and retention of internet metadata based 
only on the president's authorization); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 
PROGRAM TO DETECT AND PREVENT TERRORIST ATTACKS: MYTH VS. REALITY 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/nsa_myth_ v_reality.pdf (arguing that the President's 
Commander in Chief authority under Article II put the Bush administration's Terrorist Surveillance 
Program on solid constitutional footing). See generally John C. Yoo, The Legality of the National 
Security Agency's Bulk Data Swveillance Programs, 10 ISJLP 301 (2014), available at 
http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2369192. In many respects, Professor Yoo's 
reliance on Article II authority to justifY the constitutionality of surveillance programs mirrors the 
arguments made by the Bush administration justifying the indefinite detention of detainees at the 
Guantanamo Bay detention facility-see the govemment's claim in Hamdi as well as claims that 
Professor Y oo made while working in the Office of Legal Counsel on matters justifying the wanantless 
surveillance of domestic targets in watiime. See Memorandum from the U.S. Dep't of Justice Office of 
Legal Counsel to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep't of Def., Militaty Interrogation of 
Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the U.S. 8 n.l 0 (Mar. 14, 2003) (referring back to an earlier, 
still-secret OLC memorandum entitled, "Authority for Use of Military Force to Combat TelTorist 
Activities within the United States"). 
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(AUMF), 22 provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act (PATRIOT Act),23 the Protect 
America Act and the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (F AA)24 were enacted by 
Congress and interpreted by the NSA as providing ample legal authority for the 
capture and storage of data. 25 Compounding these statutory authorities, the 
executive branch has likely sought its own nonpublic legal guidance in the form of 
secret legal opinions from the Office of Legal Counsel memoranda26 and other 
Depmiment of Justice memoranda defending the legality and efficacy of the 
surveillance program. 27 
The surveillance and data collection that are part of the NSA Metadata 
Program have been largely validated by two forms of relatively weak judicial 
review: Article III comis have, until recently, largely refused to hear the merits of 
cases challenging the government surveillance, instead finding that plaintiffs are 
unable to satisfy the standing requirement, 28 or dismissing suits at the pleadings 
stage due to invocations of the state secrets privilege by the govemment. 29 The 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), tasked with determining the 
legality of many of the govemment's surveillance requests, has largely acquiesced 
to the govemment's requests over the years. 3° Cases litigated after the Snowden 
revelations of June 2013 suggest, however, that the judicial deference offered to the 
government in many previous counte1ienorism cases may be curtailed in light of 
public attention and critique of the NSA Metadata Program, as well as a 
22 See Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 
(2001). 
23 See Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 287 (2001) (amending the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 such that elech·onic surveillance and physical searches need only 
be justified in "significant" part by the goal of obtaining foreign intelligence); !d. at§§ 215, 702. 
24 See Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 (amending Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA)); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008). See generally AUMF; Patriot 
Act§ 215. ' 
25 See Letter from Robert Weich, Assistant Att'y Gen., to Dianne Feinstein and Saxby Chambliss, 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chair and Ranking Member (Feb. 2, 2011), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/201I_CoverLetters_Report_Collection.pdf (discussing the 
legislative basis for the NSA bulk metadata collection program). 
26 See Michael J. Glennon, National Security and Double Govemment, 5 HARV. NAT'L SECURITY 
J. 1, 78 (2014) (describing the existence and possible content of such an Office of Legal Counsel 
memorandum); Dawn E. Johnson, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Intemal Legal Constraints on 
Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1577 (2007) (noting that OLC opinions are generally 
considered binding on the executive branch); see also Sudha Setty, No More Secret Laws: How 
Transparency of Executive Branch Legal Policy Doesn't Let the Terrorists Win, 57 U. KAN. L. REv. 
579, 594-98 (2009) (detailing ways in which the Office of Legal Counsel has used secret law to justify 
and provide legal comfort to its operatives). 
27 See Weich, supra note 25 (including Justice Department analysis of the legislative authority 
supporting the NSA's bulk metadata collection program). Such memoranda, leaked to the public, have 
been used to justify other counterterrorism efforts, such as the Obama administration's use of 
extraterritorial drone strikes to kill suspected terrorists who are U.S. citizens. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO Is A SENIOR 
OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA'IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED FORCE (2010), available at 
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413 _DOJ _ White_Paper.pdf. 
28 See Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
29 See Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Obama, 705 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2012). 
3° For example, in 2012 the FISC authorized every one of the I, 788 government requests to 
conduct electronic surveillance that it was asked to rule on. See Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Principal 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to Senator Hany S. Reid (Apr. 30, 2013), available at 
http:/ /fas. org/irp/ agency/ do j/fisa/20 12rept. pdf. 
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reinvigorated judicial embrace of the privacy protections embodied in the Fourth 
Amendment. 31 
II. CURRENT MECHANISMS MIMIC THE ACCOUNTABILITY NECESSARY UNDER 
THE RULE OF LAW 
NSA surveillance and data collection has been expansive during both the 
Bush and Obama administrations and has been supported by tremendous amounts 
of law constmcted by the executive branch and Congress and constmed by the 
courts to enable smveillance with little meaningful oversight. As such, we are left 
to question whether the legal architecture provides the constraints on government 
necessaty to satisfy the basic tenets of the mle of law or, instead, if the legal 
architecture mimics and ultimately undermines efforts to uphold the rule of law. 
Snowden's revelations with regard to a variety of surveillance activities, 
including the NSA Metadata Program, provoked anger from a wide and bipartisan 
swath of the U.S. public. This in turn forced the Obama administration, Congress, 
and the courts to respond as to the roles of the various branches of government in 
ensuring control and accountability over NSA surveillance. The Obama 
administration offered a multifaceted response: defending the efficacy, legality and 
necessity of the NSA Metadata Program/2 claiming that current accountability 
mechanisms were adequate,33 and ordering reviews that allowed for the possibility 
of curtailing and/or creating additional accountability safeguards over aspects of the 
NSA Meta data Program. 34 Members of Congress varied in their reactions with 
regard to the NSA Metadata Program: some defended the legality, necessity and 
efficacy of the program, 35 while others were energized by the public disclosure to 
push for additional safeguards for civil liberties. 36 The FISC, normally insulated 
from public view, came under scmtiny as the judicial entity tasked with 
safeguarding civil liberties. As such, FISC judges were put on the defensive as to 
whether or not their decisions effectively prevented or curtailed unlawful or 
unconstitutional smveillance and, thereby, genuinely upheld the rule of law. 
31 See, e.g., Klayman v. Obama, F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2013) (finding that the Section 215 
metadata collection program is illegal and possibly unconstitutional based on Fourth Amendment 
concems); see also Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2429 (2014) (holding that a wanantless search 
of an arrested individual's cell phone contents violated the Fourth Amendment). 
32 See Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in a Press Conference, WmTE HousE (Aug. 9, 
2013 ), http://www. whitehouse. gov/the-press-office/20 13/08/09/remarks-president -press-conference 
[hereinafter August 2013 Remarks by the President]. 
33 See id. 
34 See id. 
35 See Editorial, President Obama 's Dragnet, N.Y. nMES (June 7, 2013), 
http: I lwww. nytimes. com/20 13/06/07 I opinion/president -obamas-dragnet.html ?pagewanted=all 
(describing the defense of NSA bulk data collection offered by Senate Intelligence Committee Chair 
Dianne Feinstein and Ranking Member Saxby Chambliss). 
36 See Robert Barnes, Timothy B. Lee & Ellen Nakashima, Govemment Surveillance Programs 
Renew Debate About Oversight, WASH. POST (June 8, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/government-surveillance-programs-renew-debate-about-
oversight/20 13/06/08/7f5e6dc4-d06d-ll e2-8f6b-67f40el76fD3_story.html (including comments by 
staffers to Senator Ron Wyden regarding the strict limitations on access to information regarding 
surveillance programs for members of the Senate Intelligence Committee). 
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A. Administration Claims of Accountability 
In the months after the Snowden leaks in 2013, the Obama administration 
sought to emphasize several aspects of the NSA's work with regard to the public 
debate: the danger that transparency could compromise the utility of the NSA's 
surveillance efforts; 37 the efficacy of the NSA Metadata Program in securing 
intelligence essential to detect and dismpt tenorist threats; 38 and the fact that there 
had been very few abuses of the power granted to the NSA. 39 
The administration insisted that it had shared a relatively full account of the 
NSA Metadata Program with Congress prior to Congress's reauthorization of the 
PATRIOT Act in 2011,40 underscoring its claim that the NSA was not acting as a 
rogue agency. The level of actual congressional knowledge as to the scope and 
depth of the program remains unclear. In August 2013, various members of 
Congress from both major political parties attested that they had never been given 
the infonnation at issue and had voted on PATRIOT Act renewal without a 
satisfactmy understanding of the NSA surveillance program, arguably because the 
heads of intelligence committees in Congress had chosen not to share that 
information with members not serving on those panels. 41 On the other hand, it was 
likely a matter of political self-interest for members of Congress to deny knowledge 
37 See, e.g., Josh Gerstein, Obama Aides: Transparency Plans Could Harm Security, POLITICO 
(Nov. 13, 2013 1:39 PM), http://politi.co/185oWve. This claim echoed those made by the Bush 
administration when the question of warrantless wiretapping and the complicity of telecommunications 
companies arose in 2007 and 2008. See Oversight of the U.S. Dep 't of Justice Hearing Before the 
Senate Judicial)' Conm1., llOth Cong. 7, 13-14 (2008), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-ll Oshrg52691/pdf/CHRG-110shrg5269l.pdf (providing the 
statement of Attomey General Michael Mukasey, who refused to testify as to the role of 
telecommunications companies in the government's warrantless surveillance program on the grounds 
that to do so would compromise national security interests by publicizing the '.'means and methods" 
used by the administration). The secrecy surrounding these programs makes evidence-based oversight 
and accountability measures extremely difficult if not impossible. See Jack M. Balkin, The 
Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. I, 17-18 (2008). The diffusion of 
responsibility within the national security bureaucracy, combined with the lack of transparency of 
action, also contributes to a sh·uctural inability to hold responsible individuals accountable for abuses of 
power. See PAUL C. LIGHT, THICKENING GOVERNMENT: FEDERAL HIERARCHY AND THE DIFFUSION 
OF ACCOUNTABILITY 62, 86-87 (1994). 
38 See August 2013 Remarks by the President, supra note 32. During this press conference, 
President Obama noted the efficacy of the surveillance programs arguably authorized under various 
sections of the Patriot Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: "[M]y detetmination was that 
the two programs in particular that had been an issue-215 and 702-{)ffered valuable intelligence that 
helps us protect the American people, and they're worth preserving"); see also Glennon, supra note 26, 
at 26-27, 29 (discussing the structural incentives for national security administrators to exaggerate the 
nature and scope of threats to U.S. security). 
39 See August 2013 Remarks by the President, supra note 32. President Obama insisted that the 
surveillance programs were not being abused and were being adequately overseen by the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court ("What you're hearing about is the prospect that these could be abused. 
Now part of the reason they're not abused is because they're-these checks are in place, and those 
abuses would be against the law and would be against the orders of the FISC"). 
40 See Weich, supra note 25 (outlining the bulk data collection conducted by the government 
pursuant to Section 215 of the Patriot Act and with the permission of the FISA court). 
41 See Spencer Ackerman, Intelligence Committee Withheld Key File Before Critical NSA Vote, 
Amash Claims, GUARDIAN (Aug. 12, 2013, 5:37 PM), 
http://www. theguardian.com/world/20 13/aug/ 12/intell igence-committee-nsa-vote-justin-amash (noting 
that congressional leaders had not shared the relevant information with their colleagues prior to voting 
for Patriot Act reauthorization). 
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of a program of which they had a general understanding, but was deeply unpopular 
with much of the public after the Snowden disclosures. 
As the disclosures and public critique continued, the Obama administration 
promised to increase accountability and transparency of the NSA Metadata 
Program, first by announcing the creation of the Review Group on Intelligence and 
Communications Technologies. This program was established by Director of 
National Intelligence James Clapper. 42 The announcement expressed the purpose of 
the review group as assessing whether surveillance technology was being used in a 
way that optimized national security and the advancement of U.S. foreign policy 
interests, "while appropriately accounting for other policy considerations, such as 
the risk of unauthorized disclosure and our need to maintain the public trust."43 The 
Review Group issued a lengthy report in December 2013 that focused on proactive 
suggestions, among them that the bulle collection and storage of meta data ought to 
remain in the possession of an entity outside of the government, that the statutory 
framework under the PATRIOT Act Section 215 be amended to require FISC 
authorization for the NSA to conduct searches within the bulk metadata, that more 
information regarding intelligence gathering should be disclosed to Congress and 
the public, that more consistent and rigorous accountability measures ought to be 
implemented, and that non-U.S. persons ought to be afforded more protection from 
potential U.S. government overreach. 44 
In Januaty 2014, President Obama, citing the need for continued oversight 
of intelligence agencies while defending the need for bulk data collection and for 
the secrecy surrounding that program, announced that various aspects of the NSA 
Metadata Program and other intelligence gathering initiatives would change to 
improve privacy safeguards for U.S. and non-U.S. persons. 45 President Obama 
further stated that a number of FISC opinions would be declassified and made 
public, and that transparency would become a priority for intelligence agencies. 46 
Shortly after this speech, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, an 
independent body within the executive branch whose establishment was 
recommended by the 9/11 Commission, issued a detailed report in which it 
concluded that the PATRIOT Act did not provide a statutory basis for the bulle 
collection and retention of telephony metadata, that the NSA Metadata Program 
raised constitutional concerns, and that it could find no significant evidence in 
42 See James R. Clapper, DNI Clapper Announces Review Group on Intelligence and 
Communications Technologies, OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE (Aug. 12, 2013), 
http:/ /www.dni.gov/index. php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-20 13/909-dni-clapper-
announces-review-group-on-intelligence-and-communications-technologies. 
43 Jd. Nowhere in this atmouncement were individual privacy, civil Iibeliies, and constitutional 
rights addressed. 
44 See PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC'NS TECHS., LIBERTY AND 
SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 17-21 (2013), available at 
http://www. whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/20 13-12-12_rg_final_repmi.pdf. 
45 Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence, WHITE HoUSE 
(Jan. 17, 2014, 11:15 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/20 14/01117 /remarks-president-
review-signals-intelligence [hereinafter JanUOIJ' 2014 Remarks by the President]. 
46 ld. 
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support of the efficacy of the program in dismpting and preventing terrorism 
threats. 47 
In late March 2014, the Obama administration announced that it would 
propose legislation to dismantle the bulk collection program, leaving metadata in 
the exclusive possession of telecommunications companies and requiring FISC 
authorization prior to the NSA accessing the metadata. 48 The type and scope of 
legislative restrictions were debated extensively in 2014, but no bill was passed, 
leaving open the question of whether any additional legislative control will be 
exerted by Congress-if not, the status quo of executive control over the scope and 
intrusiveness of the program will continue. 49 Section 215 of the Patr·iot Act, 
arguably providing statutory authorization of the NSA Metadata Program, is set to 
expire in July 2015, a deadline that is sure to prompt legislative debate on whether 
to renew the program, cmtail the authority granted to the administration, or 
eliminate the program altogether. The effect of any legislation in cmtailing 
intrusive surveillance practices is yet to be seen, but the fact that the administration 
has already shifted its public willingness to improving protections of privacy and 
civil libetties and increase transparency when compatible with intelligence 
gathering interests, is noteworthy as well. 50 Assessment of whether those changes 
will be meaningful must wait for further developments, particularly as it may be 
institutionally and politically difficult for the president and Congress to shift course 
dramatically in the face of still-existing terrorist threats and the political pressure 
created by the public perception of those threats. 51 
The primary message from the Obama administration since the Snowden 
disclosures has been that the administration itself is best suited to address whether 
and to what extent any recommended changes to NSA surveillance were 
appropriate, 52 and that the Snowden disclosures themselves have been unnecessaty, 
47 PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS 
PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS 
OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 10-1 I (2014), available at 
http:/ /www.pclob.gov/Library/2 I 5-Report_on_the_ Telephone_Records_Program-2.pdf. 
48 See Charlie Savage, Obama to Call for End to NS.A. 's Bulk Data Collection, N.Y. TIMES 
(March 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/25/us/obama-to-seek-nsa-curb-on-call-data.html. 
49 From late 2013 through 2014, Congress debated and amended the Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, Dragnet-Collection and Online Monitoring 
Act (USA Freedom Act), intended to curtail the bulk meta data collection program under Section 2 I 5 of 
the Patriot Act. The bill was passed in the House of Representatives, but did not pass in the Senate. 
See USA Freedom Act, H.R.336 I, !13th Cong (2013), available at https://beta.congress.gov/bill/1 13th-
congress/house-bill/3361. 
50 See Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the United States lvfilitm)' Academy 
Commencement Ceremony, WHITE HOUSE (May 28, 2014, 10:22 AM), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/20 14/05/28/remarks-president-west-point-academy-
commencement-ceremony ("Our intelligence community has done outstanding work, and we have to 
continue to protect sources and methods. But when we cannot explain our effmis clearly and publicly, 
we face terrmist propaganda and intemational suspicion, we erode legitimacy with our partners and our 
people, and we reduce accountability in our own government."); see also id. ("[W)e're putting in place 
new restrictions on how America collects and uses intelligence-because we will have fewer partners 
and be less effective if a perception takes hold that we're conducting surveillance against ordinary 
citizens."). 
51 See Sudha Setty, National Security Interest Convergence, 4 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 185, 188-189 
(2012) (highlighting the political danger of being viewed as "soft on terror"); see also Glennon, supra 
note 26, at 66 (asserting that presidents rarely change course dramatically in the arena of foreign affairs 
because of the deep entrenchment of beliefs and positions among experts and policy makers). 
52 See Glennon, supra note 26, at 40. 
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illegal, and counterproductive to both the intelligence gathering programs 
themselves and the public discourse. 53 However, there is no indication that any of 
the accountability measures now being promoted by the administration would have 
existed or gained significant purchase but for the Snowden public disclosures. 54 
The various institutional accountability mechanisms that currently exist within the 
executive branch do not appear to be equipped to consider concerns stemming frorn 
intelligence community insiders who have a fuller understanding than the public of 
the scope and nature of surveillance programs and who question the basic premise 
or constitutionality of programs such as the NSA metadata collection. To the 
contrary, there are indications that some within the NSA have actively attempted to 
avoid oversight by the Department of Justice. 55 The Office of the Inspector General 
for the NSA, appointed by and reporting to the director of the NSA, 56 is suited to 
deal with allegations of statutory and policy compliance violations, but not with a 
large scale systemic complaint about privacy and accountability such as that of 
Snowden. 57 Other potential avenues for accountability, such as the Office of the 
Inspector General for the Defense Department, are rendered irrelevant by the lack 
of information access. 58 In fact, the extreme secrecy that surrounded these 
surveillance programs, even within the administration, suggests that many existing 
executive branch mechanisms were, in the time before the Snowden disclosures, not 
engaged in effective oversight. 
53 See, e.g., Jamtmy 2014 Remarks by the President, supra note 45. 
54 Snowden provided written testimony to the European Parliament stating that he had attempted 
to discuss his concerns with regard to various aspects of NSA surveillance with superiors within the 
NSA prior to his public disclosure, but that his efforts were either ignored or rebuffed. See Edward J. 
Snowden, Answers to Written Questions From the European Parliament, EUR. PARL. I, 5 (March 7, 
2014), 
http://www .europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/20 1403/20 140307 ATT8067 4/20140307 A TT80 
674EN.pdf. 
55 See Bmion Gellman, NSA Broke Privacy Rules Thousands of Times Per Year, Audit Finds, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-broke-
privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-per-year-audit-finds/20 13/08/15/331 Oe554-05ca-ll e3-a07f-
49ddc7417125_story.html (stating that NSA operatives requesting permission to extend surveillance to 
a new target were instructed to limit the information disclosed to Justice Depmiment "overseers"). 
56 Commentators have suggested that an independently appointed and overseen Inspector General 
for the NSA would provide a better avenue for accountability. See Britt Snider & Charles Battaglia, 
The National Security Agency Needs an Independent Inspector General, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2013), 
http://www. washingtonpost. com! opini ons/nati onal-securi ty-agency-needs-an-independent-inspector-
general/20 13/09/26/ae3 7 d7fc-25f4-11 e3-ad0d-b7 c8d2a594b9 _story.html. 
57 See Interviews with NSA officials (various dates, on file with author) (discussing the fact that 
the job of the NSA Inspector General would not have been to discuss the "philosophical differences" 
that Snowden had with the NSA's programmatic and policy choices). The Inspector General for the 
NSA has publicly stated that if Snowden had complained to the Inspector General, his allegations 
would have been investigated thoroughly. DaiTen Samuelsohn, NSA Watchdog: Snowden Should Have 
Come to Me, POLITICO (Feb. 25, 2014, 6:37PM) http://politi.co/NvvjAE. But it seems quite likely that 
the extent of the Inspector General's inquiry would have been to examine the program against the 
existing statutory authority and find that the bulk data collection was statutorily authorized. 
58 See Spencer Ackerman, Pentagon Watchdog 'Not Aware' ofNSA Bulk Phone Data Collection, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 18, 2014, 3:36 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/18/pentagon-
watchdog-nsa-bulk-phone-collection (stating that the Defense Deparhnent Deputy Inspector General 
was unaware of the bulk data collection until learning about itthrough the June 2013 Snowden leaks). 
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B. Congressional Efforts at Oversight and Accountability Enforcement 
The extent of congressional knowledge regarding the NSA Metadata 
Program is not fully known to the public and has been the subject of significant 
debate. Nonetheless, even assuming that Congress was sufficiently informed as to 
the potential reach of the PATRIOT Act with regard to surveillance 59 and, therefore, 
that the statutory authority for the bulk data collection and storage was sound, the 
ability of Congress to effect significant and meaningful ex post oversight appears to 
be severely limited. 
Historically, congressional hearings and investigations have been a 
powerful tool to rein in executive branch overreaching. 60 However, it seems that 
the extreme secrecy surrounding the NSA surveillance programs undermined the 
efficacy of these oversight powers, to the point that they may have been reduced to 
an ersatz form of accountability. One prominent example stems from a Senate 
oversight hearing on March 12, 2013, in which Senator Ron Wyden specifically 
asked Director of National Intelligence James Clapper if the NSA was 
systematically gathering infonnation on the communications of millions of 
Americans. 61 Clapper denied this, yet subsequent revelations confirmed that the 
broad scope of the data collection included metadata for telephonic 
communications, as well as content data for emails, texts, and other such writings. 62 
After public discussion of the discrepancy in his testimony, Clapper commented 
that he gave the "least most untmthful" answer possible under the circumstances. 63 
Senator Wyden expressed disappointment and fi·ustration that even while under 
oath at an oversight hearing, Clapper misled the Senate. 64 
The ability for congressional oversight is further hampered by a general 
lack of access to information about the details of the NSA Meta data Program 65 and 
59 See Weich, supra note 25 (discussing the need for Congress to be sufficiently informed such 
that it could renew Section 215 of the Patriot Act in 2011). 
60 See, e.g., McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 131, 161 (1927) (noting that the power of legislative 
inquity has been long established in the United States). 
61 Senator Wyden posed the following question: "[D]oes the NSA collect any type of data at all 
on millions or hundreds of millions of Americans?" Clapper responded, "[n]o, sir." See Glenn 
Kessler, James Clapper's "Least Untruthful" Statement to the Senate, WASH. POST (June 12, 2013, 
6:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/james-clappers-least-unt:ruthful-
statement-to-the-senate/20 13/06/ll/e50677a8-d2d8-ll e2-a73e-826d299ff459 _blog.html. 
62 See Siobhan Gorman & Jennifer Valentino-Devries, New Details Show Broader NSA 
Surveillance Reach, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2013, 11:31 PM), 
http://online.wsj .com/article/SB I 00014241278873241 08204579022874091732470.ht:ml (describing 
how 75% of email traffic, including the content of emails, sent or received by United States persons is 
captured by various NSA programs). 
63 See James R. Clapper, Director James R. Clapper Interview with Andrea Mitchell, OFFICE OF 
THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE (June 8, 2013, 1:00 PM), 
http://www .dni.gov/index. php/newsroom/speeches-and-interviews/195-speeches-interviews-20 13/87 4-
director-james-r-clapper-interview-with-andrea-mitchell. 
64 See Aaron Blake, Sen. Wyden: Clapper Didn't Give 'Straight Answer' on NSA programs, 
WASH. PosT (June 11, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/06/ll/sen-
wyden-clapper-didnt-give-st:raight-answer-on-nsa-programs. 
65 See Weich, supra note 25 (detailing the limitations on sharing information with staffers, taking 
notes, or retaining any written record of the infmmation that members of congressional oversight access 
with regard to the NSA bulk metadata collection program). 
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lack of ability to discuss publicly whatever knowledge is shared with Congress. 66 
In fact, it remains unclear whether senators, including Dianne Feinstein, Chair of 
the Senate Intelligence Committee, knew of the lapses in NSA procedure until after 
such information was leaked to news sources. 67 Further revelations indicate that 
administration statements made to Congress even after the Snowden disclosures 
were not entirely accurate. 68 These examples are not determinative, but taken 
together, they raise significant doubt to the extent of accurate infmmation regarding 
surveillance programs being made available to congressional oversight committees, 
and whether the oversight committees can function as effective accountability 
measures69 without the benefit of illegally leaked information such as the Snowden 
disclosures. 
C. Judicial Review 
Two fmms of relatively weak judicial review exist over the NSA Metadata 
Program. The primary mechanism by which the NSA has legitimated its 
surveillance activities is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), a 
closed, non-adversarial setting. Article III courts have had the opportunity to 
consider post-9/11 surveillance programs on numerous occasions, and with few 
exceptions, Article III courts have refused to review matters of national security-
related surveillance. 
I. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
The FISC differs from Article III courts in numerous ways: Its statutory 
scope is limited to matters of foreign intelligence gathering; its judges are appointed 
in the sole discretion of the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court; its 
proceedings are secret; its opinions are often secret or are published in heavily 
66 See Senator Ron Wyden & Senator Mark Udall, Wyden, Udall Statement on Reports of 
Compliance Violations Made Under NSA Collection Programs, RON WYDEN SENATOR FOR OR. (Aug. 
16, 20 13 ), http://www. wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-udall-statement-on-reports-of-
compliance-violations-made-under-nsa-collection-programs (noting that the disclosures of thousands of 
violations by the NSA are ']ust the tip of a larger iceberg" and that they are prohibited fi'om discussing 
the further problematic aspects of the NSA surveillance program by Senate rules). 
67 See Gellman, supra note 55 (noting that Senator Feinstein only leamed of the audit from the 
Washington Post). 
68 See NSA Report on Privacy Violations in the First Quarter of 2012, WASH. POST (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2015), available at http:/lapps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-repmi-on-privacy-
violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/; Gellman, supra note 55 (providing and detailing the audit 
that found 2,276 violations of the NSA's own rules in several surveillance locations); see also Ellen 
Nakashima, Lawmakers, Privacy Advocates Call for Reforms at NSA, WASH. PosT (Aug. 16, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/lawmakers-privacy-advocates-call-for-
reforms-at-nsa/2013/08/16/7cccb772-0692-ll e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story.html (stating that the White 
House emphasized that although there were a small number of "willful" transgressions, most were 
unintentional). 
69 Senator Dimme Feinstein's March 2014 allegations that the Central Intelligence Agency was 
conducting illegal and unconstitutional surveillance of communications among her staff members 
reinforced the perception that the surveillance apparatus of the administration was beyond the ability of 
Congress to effect meaningful oversight. See Mark Mazzetti, Computer Searches at Center of Dispute 
on CIA Allegations, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2014), http://nyti.ms/lq95eGD (detailing allegations of CIA 
surveillance of Senate investigative work regarding Bush-era intenogation practices). 
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redacted form; and its process is not adversarial as only government lawyers make 
arguments defending the legality of the surveillance being contemplated. 70 Many of 
these differences bring into doubt the legitimacy of the court, its ability to afford 
adequate due process regarding civil liberties concerns, and its ability to uphold the 
rule of law in terms of government accountability. Compounding this legitimacy 
deficit is the FISC's own loosening of the relevance standard under Section 215 of 
the PATRIOT Act such that the FISC has found that bulk data collection without 
any particularized threat or connection to terrorism is legally permissible. 71 
Historically, the FISC has rejected NSA surveillance applications too 
infrequently to be considered a substantial check on government overreach as an ex 
ante matter. 72 As an ex post matter, it is unclear to what extent the FISC's work 
guarantees any meaningful accountability over NSA surveillance activities. On the 
one hand, because the FISC lacks an adversarial process and has no independent 
investigatmy authority, the FISC only addresses ex post compliance problems when 
the government itself brings the problem to the comt's attention. 73 As such, FISC 
judges rely on the statements of the government as to the govemment's own 
behavior and lack the authority to investigate the veracity of the government's 
representations. 74 For example, in 2011, the FISC found one aspect of the 
surveillance program~brought to its attention months after the program went into 
effece5 ~to be unconstitutional. 76 Additionally, in one declassified opinion, the 
FISC critiques the NSA's sloppy over-collection of metadata of U.S. 
communications, and questions the efficacy of bulk data collection as a national 
security measure. 77 At one point, the FISC sanctioned the NSA for overreaching in 
70 See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012); see generally 
Laura K. Donohue, Bulk A1etadata Collection: Statuto!)' and Constitlllional Considerations, 37 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 757 (2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2344774 (describing the process by which the FISC 
detennines whether surveillance is legal). 
71 See Jennifer Valentino-Devries & Siobhan Gorman, Secret Court's Redefinition of 'Relevant' 
Empowered Vast NSA Data-Gathering, WALL ST. J. (July 8, 2013), 
http://online. wsj.com/news/articles/SB I 0001424 I 27887323873904578571893758853344. 
72 Between 1979 and 2012, the FISC received over 30,000 surveillance applications from the 
government and rejected fewer than 0.1% of them. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court 
Orders 1979-2012, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa_stats.html 
(last updated May I, 2014). 
73 See Jnre Prod. of Tangible Things from Redacted, No. BR 08-13, 2009 WL 9150913 (Foreign 
Intel. Surv. Ct. Mar. 2, 2009) (reprimanding NSA for the non-compliance with FISC orders). 
74 See Carol D. Leonnig, Court: Ability to Police U.S. Spying Program Is Limited, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 15, 20 I 3), http://www. washingtonpost.cornlpolitics/court-ability-to-police-us-spying-program-
limited/2013/08/15/4a8c8c44-05cd-11e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story.html (citing U.S. district judge 
Reggie Walton and noting that "the court lacks the tools to independently verify how often the 
government's surveillance breaks the court's rules ... [and] it also cannot check the veracity of the 
goverrunent's assertions that the violations its staff members report are unintentional mistakes"). 
75 See Gellman, supra note 55 (noting that the FISC decision was issued in October 2011, months 
after the program had been initiated). 
76 See First Direct Evidence of Illegal Surveillance Found by the FISA Court, WASH. POST (Oct. 
12, 2011), available at http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/first-direct-evidence-of-illegal-
surveillance-found-by-the-fisa-court/393/ (noting an October 3, 2011 decision by FISC invalidating 
certain aspects ofthe NSA's surveillance programs). 
77 See Judge's Opinion on N.S.A. Program, N.Y. TIMES 5 (Aug. 22, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/08/22/us/22nsa-opinion-document.html (discussing the fact 
that some of the searches being run by the NSA were "wholly umelated" to the stated purpose of those 
searches and that it was unclear whether the government's efforts to protect against umelated searches 
were effective); see also Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, Secret Court Rebuked N.S.A. on Surveillance, 
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saving all metadata and mnning daily metadata against an "alert list" of 
approximately 17,800 phone numbers, only 10% of which had met FISC's legal 
standard for reasonable suspicion. 78 On such occasions, the adminish·ation has 
modified problematic aspects of the surveillance and continued forward without 
further impediment by the FISC. 79 
On the other hand, the fact that the NSA itself has brought potential 
compliance incidents to the notice of the FISC80 indicates at least some internal 
policing of these programs. However, this is hardly an effective substitute for 
external review and accountability mechanisms that would ensure that consistent 
controls are in place. Further, the self-repmting of these compliance incidents does 
not in any way allow for discourse over the larger stmctural questions surrounding 
the surveillance programs. 
Finally, the ability of the FISC to act as an effective check on NSA 
oveneaching is severely limited by the secrecy and lack of information available to 
the FISC judges. Judge Reggie B. Walton, formerly the Chief Judge of the FISC, 
lamented that "[t]he FISC is forced to rely upon the accuracy of the information that 
is provided to the Court .... The FISC does not have the capacity to investigate 
issues of noncompliance .... "81 The ability of the NSA to not only gather and 
retain bulk metadata, but also to build in backdoor access into data files despite 
private encryption efforts has been largely sanctioned by the FISC based on NSA 
representations as to the seriousness of the security threats posed to the nation. 82 In 
an enviromnent in which there is a tremendous fear of being held responsible for 
any future terrorist attack that might occur on U.S. soil, 83 and in which there is a 
N.Y. TiMES (Aug. 22, 2013 ), http://www.nytimes.com/20 13/08/22/us/2011-ruling-found-an-nsa-
program-unconstitutional.html?pagewanted=all (detailing the various ways in which the court found the 
NSA's surveillance to be unconstitutional). 
78 See Scott Shane, Court Upbraided N.S.A. on Its Use of Call-Log Data, N.Y. TiMES (Sept. 11, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/ll/us/couti-upbraided-nsa-on-its-use-of-call-log-
data.html?pagewanted=all (noting that the FISC issued a "sharply worded" ruling in March 2009 
describing the NSA's failure to compmi with the limits set by the FISC and noting that the NSA had 
deliberately misled the FISC). 
79 See Ba1ion Gellman, NSA Statements to the Post, WASH. PosT (Aug. 15, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-statements-to-the-
post/2013/08/15/f40dd2c4-05d6-lle3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story.html (clarifying the effect of the FISC 
decision and noting that the surveillance program was modified such that it could continue with the 
approval of the FISC). 
80 In re Prod. of Tangible Things from Redacted, No. BR 08-13, 2009 WL 9150913 at *5 
(Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Mar. 2, 2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/sectionlpub_Feb%2026%202009%20Notification%20of'/o20Comp 
liance%20lncident.pdf (including NSA admission that the handling of metadata did not comply with 
the FISC's previous orders and outlining a plan to remedy the situation). 
81 See Carol Leonnig, Court: Ability to Police U.S. Spying Program Limited, WASH. PosT (Aug. 
15, 2013 ), http://www. washingtonpost.com/politics/court-ability-to-police-us-spying-program-
limited/2013/08/15/4a8c8c44-05cd-ll e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story.html (quoting Judge Walton's 
written comments to the Washington Post). 
82 See Nicole Perlroth, Jeff Larson & Scott Shane, N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of 
Privacy on Web, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-
internet-encryption.html?pagewanted=all (discussing NSA efforts to make encryption software 
vulnerable, and noting that much of this activity has been sanctioned by the FISC). 
83 Transcript of President Obama's Jan. 17 Speech on NSA Reforms, WASH. PosT (Jan 17, 2014), 
http://www. washingtonpost. com/politics/full-text-of-president -o bamas-j an-1 7 -speech-on -nsa-
reforms/20 14/0 l/17/fa33590a-7f8c-11 e3-9556-4a4bf7bcbd84_story.html (noting that the NSA worked 
under the concern that if another terrorist attack occurred, the NSA might be held responsible, President 
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information deficit for those outside of the intelligence community, the FISC has 
consistently deferred to the NSA's assertions and has not been able to act as an 
effective accountability mechanism. 
2. Article III Courts 
Article III courts have consistently been waty of wading into the debate 
over surveillance, almost always dismissing cases in the post-9/11 context on 
procedural or secrecy grounds, 84 despite 85 the net effect of precluding even those 
individuals with concrete evidence that their privacy and civil liberties had been 
infringed from having their grievances heard. 86 Although the Snowden disclosures 
have given more purchase to plaintiffs challenging data collection and surveillance, 
some Article III comts continue to find that plaintiffs have no grounds to stop the 
NSA' s data and meta data collection, retention, and analysis. 
The case of Clapper v. Amnesty International, 87 decided in early 2013, 
prior to the Snowden disclosures, exemplifies the traditional lack of relief available 
to plaintiffs in Article III comts. In Clapper, plaintiffs, including attorneys, non-
profit humanitarian organizations, and journalists, alleged that their ability to 
communicate with and advise overseas clients and sources was severely 
compromised by the fact that their phone calls were likely being surveilled by the 
NSA or other U.S. government agencies. The United States Supreme Comt 
dismissed plaintiffs' suit on standing grounds, holding that plaintiffs "cannot 
manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears 
of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending."88 
Immediately after Snowden's June 2013 disclosures that the telephony data 
of all U.S. persons is being systematically collected and stored by the NSA, the 
ability of plaintiffs to clear the procedural hurdle of standing improved, since the 
"fears of hypothetical future harm" that allowed the Clapper majority to dismiss 
that case were no longer hypothetical, but publicly known as fact. However, the 
question of whether plaintiffs were granted any substantive relief is yet to be 
determined, since district comts have come to differing conclusions on the question 
of the metadata collection program's constitutionality. 
Obama mentioned this pressure overtly; it is certainly plausible that the members of the FISC view 
themselves under similar pressure). 
84 See Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) [hereinafter Clapper I] (dismissing 
suit alleging unconstitutional and unlawful surveillance based on standing grounds); Al-Haramain 
Islamic Found., Inc. v. Obama, 690 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir. 2012) (reversing lower court decision and 
dismissing suit that alleged unlawful government surveillance based on government invocation of the 
state secrets privilege). 
85 Some commentators suggest that courts are deliberate in their efforts to prevent rigorous 
examination of national security policies as a means of entrenching power in the national security 
policymakers. See Glennon, supra note 26, at 47-52. 
86 See Sudha Setty, Judicial Formalism and the State Secrets Privilege, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 1629, 1651-52 (2012) (arguing that U.S. courts need to engage affirmatively in the adjudication 
of national security litigation). 
87 See Clapper I. 
88 See Clapper I at *2. 
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In American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper ("Clapper If'), filed days 
after the initial Snowden disclosures, 89 the ACLU and other organizations claimed 
that the NSA's metadata collection and retention program violated their First and 
Fourth amendment rights by inhibiting their ability to speak freely with clients and 
by umeasonably searching and seizing their communications. 90 Judge Pauley of the 
Southern District of New York rejected these claims, holding that although the 
meta data "[i]f plumbed ... can reveal a rich profile of every individual,"91 under the 
long-standing precedent of Smith v. MaJ)I/and, 92 plaintiffs had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy over their telephony metadata. Futiher, Judge Pauley 
accepted the government's position that the metadata was necessary in disrnpting 
several terrorist threats, and that such counterterrorism work could not have 
occuned without the vast trove of data available through the NSA Metadata 
Program. 93 
With similar facts and claims, 94 Judge Leon of the District Court of the 
District of Columbia in Klayman v. Obama differed fi·om the Clapper II court and 
concluded that the constitutionality, statutory authority and efficacy of the NSA's 
bulk metadata collection program is, at best, questionable. 95 Judge Leon used these 
distinctions of both scope and depth of surveillance to establish that the NSA 
meta data program constituted a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. 96 In a 
particularly remarkable analysis, Judge Leon reasoned that the continuously 
expanding use of technology in the everyday lives of most Americans justified a 
greater expectation of privacy over information that is shared electronically, not an 
ever-shrinking realm of protection over personal privacy. 97 
Having established that a search occurred, Judge Leon considered the 
plaintiffs' request for preliminary injunctive relief, finding that there was a 
89 See Complaint for Declarat01y and Injunctive Relief, ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13-3994 
(S.D.N.Y. June II, 2013) [hereinafter Clapper II], available at 
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/nsa_phone_spying_complaint.pdf. 
90 See Clapper II. 
91 See id. at *2. 
92 !d. at *39-40 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 ( 1979)) (holding that plaintiff had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy over telephone metadata, such as the telephone numbers of calls 
dialed from or received by his home telephone, since that information had been voluntarily shared with 
a third party, the telephone company). 
93 See id. at *35. The court further rejected plaintiffs' First Amendment claim on both standing 
and substantive grounds, holding that any chilling effect on plaintiffs' conmmnications was based on 
their own "speculative fear" that their data was being reviewed by the NSA, not simply collected like 
that of every other U.S. person. See id. at *46-47. 
94 Plaintiffs alleged violations of the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments, as well as statutory 
violations. See Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d I, 9 (D.D.C. 2013). 
95 !d. at 5-6 (granting, but staying, a preliminary injunction based on the likelihood that plaintiffs 
would prevail on statutory and constitutional grounds). 
96 !d. at 44-45. Judge Leon framed the questions as, "When do present-day circumstances-the 
evolutions in the Government's surveillance capabilities citizens' phone habits, and the relationship 
between the NSA and telecom companies-become so thoroughly unlike those considered by the 
Supreme Court thirty-four years ago that a precedent like Smith simply does not apply? The answer ... 
is now." !d. at 45. Judge Leon took careful note of the Government's "almost Orwellian" surveillance 
capabilities, which informed his analysis of what constitutes a search. !d. at 49-50. 
97 !d. at 54-55. This analysis reflects the thinking of Justice Marshall in his Smith v. MmJ>land 
dissent, in which he opined that "unless a person is prepared to forgo use of what for many has become 
a personal or professional necessity, he cannot help but accept the risk of surveillance." 442 U.S. at 
750 (refening to the govemment's argument that by using his home telephone, Smith had assumed the 
risk of government surveillance) (internal citations omitted). 
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significant likelihood that the plaintiffs would succeed in demonstrating that the 
surveillance and searches were unreasonable and, therefore, unconstitutional. To 
do so, he touched upon the intrusive nature of the search and, differing significantly 
ft·om Judge Pauley in Clapper II, found that the govemment had not made a 
showing that the NSA Meta data Program was necessary to the govemment' s 
counterterrorism efforts. 98 
Klayman offers some reason for optimism among civil libertarians: Not 
only did an Article III comi decide a post-9/11 abuse of power case on its merits, 
but that decision held that the NSA surveillance at issue was likely in violation of 
the Fomih Amendment. Whether appellate courts will follow the line of reasoning 
in Klayman as opposed to that of Clapper II and Smith, however, remains unclear. 99 
It is also difficult to predict how the U.S. Supreme Comi will respond when 
confronted with this matter. On the one hand, individual members of the Court 
have expressed skepticism as to the appropriateness of judicial review in matters of 
national security-related surveillance. 100 On the other, the Court as a whole has 
recently shown significant interest in rethinking the parameters of govemment 
surveillance. In the 2012 case United States v. Jones, the Court found that 
warrantless GPS tracking of an individual's movements for an extended period of 
time contravened the parameters set in Smith. 101 The two concurrences in Jones 
further suggested reworkings of the Smith framework in light of changing 
technology and an increased need for robust privacy protection given the 
government's ability to access telephonic data with ease. 102 The opinion in 
Klayman focused on Jones to illustrate the need to rethink the nature and scope of 
privacy given the vastly different use of technology of today as compared to the 
1970s, when Smith was decided. 103 In mid-2014, the Supreme Court followed this 
rights-protective line of reasoning when it decided Riley v. California, holding that 
wanantless searches of the electronic contents of an anestee's cell phone were in 
98 ld. at 61. 
99 As of this writing, Klayman and Clapper 11 are under appeal before the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals and the Second Circuit Comi of Appeals, respectively. Both cases have been briefed and oral 
arguments were heard in Fall2014. 
100 See e.g., Matthew Barakat, Scalia E>.pects NSA Program to End Up in Court, AssociATED 
PRESS (Sept. 25, 2013), available at hrtp://news.yahoo.com/scalia-expects-nsa-wiretaps-end-court-
145501284-politics.html. In a speech to the Northern Virginia Technology Council, Justice Scalia 
stated: 
I d. 
[W]hether the NSA can do the stuff it's been doing ... which used to be a question for the people 
. . . will now be resolved by the branch of government that knows the least about the issues in 
question, the branch that knows the least about the extent of the threat against which the 
wiretapping is directed. 
101 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012). 
102 See id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Justice Sotomayor argued that warrantless 
surveillance that involves no physical trespass but mines and stores a large volume of data may still be 
subject to classification as a "search" for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id. She noted that such 
surveillance, especially in today's society, has the potential to "chill[] associational and expressive 
fi·eedoms," and "is susceptible to [government] abuse." ld. at 956; see also id. at 957 (Alito, J., 
concurring). Justice Alito would evaluate Fomih Amendment claims based on the reasonable 
expectation of privacy of individuals, taking into account the changing nature of this expectation as 
technology advances. Jd. at 958. Justice Alito notes that legislation that curtails warrantless 
surveillance may be the best action to deal with the questions left open by Jones, but notes that such 
legislation does not seem to have materialized at the state or federal level. I d. at 964. 
103 Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2013). 
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violation of the Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and 
• 104 se1zure. 
These rights-protective perspectives-offered by justices with different 
political and theoretical perspectives-may offer a preview of a significant 
jurispmdential shift not only in hearing security-related cases on their merits, but in 
finding for plaintiffs alleging privacy and civil liberties infringements. However, 
the historically deferential attitude of comis toward matters of national security, a 
stance that has only compounded in the post-9/11 context, suggests that this may 
continue to be an uphill battle for civil libertarians. 105 
More troubling to proponents of the efficacy of existing legislative and 
executive accountability mechanisms are the disclosures made by Snowden. These 
mechanisms were revealed to be either theoretical or passive until significant leaks 
forced a public discourse that demanded a more active accountability regime. In 
fact, the federal government exploited the lack of transparency and effective 
accountability mechanisms until the stmi of the Snowden disclosures to secure 
dismissals like that in Clapper I and to circumvent efforts of criminal defendants to 
discover whether they had been actually surveilled. 106 
Reliance on sporadic leaks to trigger genuine accountability is stmcturally 
problematic. 107 Our reliance on leaks thus far should force us to reconsider the 
extreme secrecy under which intelligence-gathering programs, like the NSA 
Metadata Program, are administered, and to consider means by which institutional 
actors can exert meaningful and regular oversight and control over these programs. 
Such change would force politicians to take ownership over secret counterterrorism 
programs, weighing their expediency against possible constitutional defects or the 
judgment of public opinion. An atmosphere in which accountability mechanisms 
are not merely ersatz pending an illegal leak could provide space for genuine public 
discourse and at least the possibility of greater protection of civil liberties. 
III. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SURVEILLANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Both the United Kingdom and India have stmggled greatly with 
establishing effective surveillance mechanisms and with maintaining privacy rights 
and civil liberties. As democracies with a shared legal background and ongoing 
intelligence sharing, yet with different govenunent and accountability stmctures, 
these nations provide useful comparisons to the United States in terms of examining 
the efficacy of counterterrorism surveillance and the concomitant strength of 
accountability measures and safeguards. 
104 Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014). 
105 See generally Setty, supra note 86. 
106 See, e.g., David Kravets, Feds Won't Say If NSA Surveilled New York Terror Suspects, WIRED 
(May 13, 2013 ), http://www.wired.com/20 13/05/feds-mum-on-terror-suspects/. 
107 Cf RAHUL SAGAR, SECRETS AND LEAKS: THE DILEMMA OF STATE SECRECY (Princeton 
Univ. Press 2013) (arguing that the status quo of incomplete oversight coupled with sporadic leaks is 
the best realistic option for national security accountability); David Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why 
the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
512 (2013) (describing ways in which leaks are an integral and adaptive mechanism of information 
disclosure for the US federal government). 
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A. United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom has been dealing with internal and external security 
threats for decades. Shortly after the end of World War II, the United Kingdom 
recognized the dual needs of access to global intelligence and protection of its own 
privacy interests from the intelligence-gathering operations of enemies and allies 
alike. Thus, in the early Cold War era, the United Kingdom and United States 
entered into what is now known as the UKUSA Agreement, which structured 
intelligence sharing and prohibited spying on each other. 108 This relationship has 
grown over the decades, and remains a strong one. However, U.K. legislative and 
judicial responses to terrorism and security-related threats have evolved in a 
somewhat different direction, reflecting domestic statutes and couti decisions that 
are responsive to both internal politics and pressures as well as European Union-
level mandates on counterterrorism activities and constraints on intrusions into the 
private lives of individuals living within the European Union. 109 
Although the NSA Metadata Program has garnered significant global 
publicity and criticism, telecommunications providers within the European Union 
have been collecting and retaining E.U. telephonic and Internet metadata for 
extended periods of time since at least 2006. This collection has been a topic of 
much discussion and has spawned multiple directives within the United Kingdom 
and by the European Union. This practice and has recently been discontinued. 
Tracing how the United Kingdom's domestic counte1ierrorism agenda, including 
bulk metadata collection, has developed in conjunction with and in response to EU-
level directives, sheds light on an alternative approach to balancing security needs 
and accountability on these matters. 
The United Kingdom's Regulation of Investigative Powers Act ("RIP A"), 
implemented in 2000, authorized a significant amount of domestic and external data 
collection, but also instituted some safeguards to protect privacy interests. 110 
Among these was the creation of the Investigative Powers Tribunal, which was 
granted jurisdiction over individual complaints related to the conduct of intelligence 
services. 111 In 2002, the European Union adopted a Directive on Privacy and 
Electronic Communicationsn2 that, among other things, ensured that the privacy of 
individuals using telephones and the internet to communicate was maintained even 
in light of rapidly evolving technology, and mandated the destruction of data held 
by telecommunications companies and internet providers after billing and other 
such purposes had been fulfilled. 113 
108 See Amendment No.4 to the Appendices to the UKUSA Agreement, May 10, 1955, available 
at http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/ _files/ukusa/new_ukusa_agree_l Omay55.pdf (reaffirming the terms 
of the original March 1946 agreement and expanding the treaty to include Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand, thus creating the Cold War intelligence arrangement sometimes referred to as the "Five 
Eyes."). See generally Paul Farrell, HistOIJ' of 5-Eyes-Explainer, GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 2013), 
available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/history-of-5-eyes-explainer. 
109 For a thorough discussion of the multi-layered system of protecting fundamental rights in the 
European Union, see FEDERICO FABBRINI, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE: CHALLENGES AND 
TRANSFORMATIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2014). 
110 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, c. 23, (U.K.) [hereinafter RIP A]. 
111 RIPA, supra note 110, § 65. 
112 Eur. Pari. Directive 2002/58/EC, On Privacy and Electronic Communications, July 12, 2002. 
113 Id. ~~ 7, 20, 22. 
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In 2006, partially in reaction to the 2004 Madrid train bombing and the 
2005 London underground bombings, the European Union adopted Directive 
2006/24/EC. 114 The directive amended previous directives and mandated, in 
accordance with the principle of proportionality and with respect for individual 
privacy, that domestic telephonic and internet metadata be retained by 
telecommunications companies for law enforcement and countetienorism 
investigatory purposes for six to twenty-four months. 115 
Because of the systematic data retention mandated by Directive 
2006/24/EC and the extensive and intrusive surveillance technology known to be 
used by the government, 116 numerous parliamentary committees have undertaken 
investigations of the surveillance apparatus in the United Kingdom. A broad 
investigation by the Constitution Committee led to findings in 2009 that the 
intelligence-gathering services were largely compliant with the law, but that report 
included numerous recommendations for changes to surveillance authority and 
transparency. Among the recommendations were giving greater consideration to 
civil liberties before implementing further smveillance programs, 117 granting greater 
authority to various commissioners to exercise increased oversight, 118 revisiting 
existing legislation to increase specificity in the smveillance authority, 119 and 
making the work and role of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal more visible to the 
public. 120 Since the tribunal operates and deliberates in secret, offers limited 
procedural and substantive rights, and has never ruled in favor of a complainant, the 
tribunal is open to critique that, like the FISC in the United States, it merely rubber 
stamps decisions made by the intelligence agencies and masks a lack of genuine 
accountability for government abuse of civil libetiies. 121 Increased transparency 
over the tribunal's operations may help boost its efficacy as a constraining 
institution on the U.K. intelligence community and, in fact, has already given the 
public better insight into the operations of the tribunal and the types of issues it is 
114 Eur. Pari. Directive 2006/24/EC, On the Retention of Data Generated or Processed in 
Connection with the Provision of Publicly Available Electronic Communications Services o1· of Public 
Communications Networks and Amending Directive 2002/58/EC, March 15, 2006, '11 10 
(acknowledging the need for revised intelligence-gathering procedures in light of recent terrorist acts). 
ns ld., art. 5 (describing categories ofmetadata to be retained); id. art. 6 (mandating retention for 
at least six months and not more than two years). It is notewotihy that the United Kingdom, along with 
15 other members of the European Union, declared its intention to postpone application of the directive 
to intemet data; Declaration by the United Kingdom pursuant to Article 15(3) of Directive 2006/24/EC. 
116 See Clive Walker, Championing Local Surveillance in Counter-Terrorism, in Fergal Davis, et 
aJ., SURVEILLANCE, COUNTER-TERRORISM AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 24 (2014) 
(describing the U.K. government's "all-risks surveillance" approach to detecting terrorism threats 
before they are actualized). 
ll? Constitution Committee, Second Report, Surveillance: Citizens and the State, 2008-9, H.L.l8-
I, '1]'1]11 0, 144; see also id. '1]307 (recommending that the government amend the Data Protection Act 
1998 to require the issuance of an independent, public, and detailed Privacy Impact Assessment prior to 
the adoption of any new surveillance or information collection). 
118 Id. '1]'1]137, 231,237,436. 
119 Id. '1],[357, 379. 
120 Id. '1]259. 
121 See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Anglo-American Privacy and Surveillance, 96 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1059, 1171-72 (2006) (arguing that the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, charged with 
reviewing complaints as to surveillance impermissibly infringing on civil rights, lacked operational 
transparency and functionally added nothing to existing mechanisms to protect individual rights). 
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hearing. 122 However, because the tribunal only acts when a complaint is brought to 
it, even if it were functioning in a fair and impartial manner, it is structurally unable 
to act as a comprehensive check on government abuse. 123 
As in the United States, the Snowden disclosures that began in June 2013 
prompted additional reviews of the various programs in which British intelligence 
agencies were involved, including those that related to telephonic and Internet data 
collection and retention. Among the Snowden disclosures were: the extent to 
which the United Kingdom's signals intelligence organization, Government 
Communications Headquarters ("GCHQ"), worked with the NSA on 
counterencryption efforts used in the United States, United Kingdom, and 
elsewhere; 124 the progress of GCHQ' s own counterencryption effmt; 125 GCHQ 's 
receipt of data from the NSA's PRISM program to intercept and store data from 
internet service providers; 126 and GCHQ's interception and storage of images from 
webcam chats. 127 
An investigation by the Intelligence and Security Committee of the 
Parliament considered the question 128 of whether GCHQ' s receipt of information 
from the NSA via the PRISM program was legal, conducting its analysis under the 
statutory framework of the Intelligence Services Act, 129 Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act, 130 and the Human Rights Act. 131 The committee ultimately found that 
122 See Katrin Bennhold, In Britain, Guidelines for Spying on Lawyers and Clients, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 6, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/ll/07/world/europe/in-britain-guidelines-
for-spying-on-lawyers-and-clients.html (discussing the Investigatory Powers Tribunal's order to 
disclose govermnent documents related to the practice of intercepting communications between clients 
and their attorneys); see also Government Forced to Release Secret Policy on Surveillance of Lawyers, 
REPRIEVE (Nov. 6, 2014), 
http://www .reprieve.org.uk/press/20 14_11_ 06_uk_govt_force_release_spying__lawyers/ 
123 See Walker, supra note 116, at 32. 
124 See Nicole Perlroth, Jeff Larson, & Scott Shane, N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of 
Privacy on Web, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-
foils-much-intemet-encryption.html?pagewanted=all (discussing coordination between the NSA and 
GCHQ on the Bullrun program, an effort to penetrate encryption baniers on online communications). 
125 See id; see also James Ball, Julian Borger, & Glenn Greenwald, Revealed: How US and UK 
Spy Agencies Defeat Intemet Privacy and Security, GUARDIAN (Sept. 5, 2013), 
http://www. theguardian. com/world/20 13/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security (describing the 
Edgehill program). 
126 See GCHQ Use of Prism Surveillance Data was Legal, Says Report, BBC (July 17, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-23341597. 
127 See Spencer Ackerman & James Ball, Optic Nerve: Millions of Yahoo Webcam Images 
Intercepted by GCHQ, GUARDIAN (Feb. 27, 2014), 
http://www .theguardian.com/world/20 14/feb/27 /gchq -nsa-webcam-images-internet -yahoo (describing a 
GCHQ initiative supported by the NSA that captured images from Yahoo! account users' webcam 
chats from 2008 to 2012). 
128 See Statement from the Intelligence and Secudty Committee of Parliament on GCHQ's 
Alleged Interception of Communications under the US PRISM Programme (July 17, 2013), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/225459/ISC-Statement-
on-GCHQ.pdf. 
129 Intelligence Services Act, 1994, c. 13 (U.K.). This act authorizes the activity of secret 
intelligence surveillance for national security purposes and requires minimization procedures to limit 
the impact of surveillance on privacy rights. See id. §§ 1-3. 
130 See RIPA, supra note 110, §1(1) (authmizing the interception of communications for certain 
purposes). RIPA further authorizes the interception of external communications if warranted by the 
Secretary of State, as was the case with regard to the Prism program. See id. §§ 8(4)-(5). 
131 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.). The aim of this Act is to give domestic effect to the 
rights contained in the European Convention on Human Rights. 
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GCHQ's actions with regard to PRISM were compliant with the statutory 
framework, but concluded that the parameters of surveillance authority required 
additional specificity and consideration. 132 That reconsideration of potential 
reforms to cmiail authority was taken up by a variety of legislators but did not gain 
significant purchase in Parliament. 
Further frustrating the cause of civil libertarians is the fact that, under 
RIP A, the sole recourse for challenging such actions under U.K. law is making a 
claim to the Investigatmy Powers Tribunal. While the Human Rights Act 1998 
incorporates the European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR") into U.K. 
domestic law, thus permitting the judiciary to declare incompatibility if it believes 
that a national security measure is incompatible with the ECHR standard, this does 
not constitute a mandate that the domestic security apparatus change its policies. 133 
As such, review at the domestic level has often been sharply curtailed, and review 
at the supranational level potentially offers a more fmitful avenue to pursue civil 
libe1iies claims. 
Although the Treaty of the European Union provides that "national security 
remains the sole responsibility of each Member State,"134 the question of how to 
resolve conflicts between domestic security measures and the robust privacy and 
dignity protections under various European Union conventions and treaties is 
complicated and to some extent remains unresolved. The European Convention on 
Human Rights provides a number of protections for individuals, including the right 
to respect for an individual's private and family life, his home, and his 
correspondence. 135 However, that provision is followed by a caveat that allows for 
wide latitude for government intmsions on privacy when they are "in accordance 
with the law and [are] necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the countly, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others."136 This national security exception is broadly 
enough drafted such that it may, in many instances, swallow the privacy right 
altogether. 137 
For residents of the United Kingdom, a similar dynamic exists with regard 
to the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights: The text of the charter 
contains a broad and thick privacy protection for personal life and data, 138 but the 
United Kingdom has acceded to the charter and to the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon with 
the reservation of opt-outs that-at least arguably-allow U.K. authorities to escape 
132 See Statement from the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament on GCHQ's 
Alleged Interception of Communications under the US PRISM Programme, supra note 128, ~ 7. 
133 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.) § 4. 
134 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union art. 4, Oct. 26,2012,2012 O.J. (C 326) 18. 
135 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8( I), Nov. 4, 
1950, E.T.S. No.5 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
136 Jd. art. 8(2). 
137 This is patiicularly true in cases in which a government could invoke Atiicle 15 of the ECHR, 
allowing a country to derogate fi·om its obligations in times of national emergency. E.g., A. v. United 
Kingdom, 2009-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 137, ~~ 181, 190 (finding that the derogation must be in response to 
imminent national emergency and the scope of the derogation can be evaluated for proportionality). 
138 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, arts. 7, 8, Dec. 18, 2000, 2000 O.J. 
(C 364) I (discussing protection of private and family life, as well as personal data, respectively). 
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broad privacy protections in matters that touch on the areas of freedom, security, 
and justice. 139 Likewise, the previously discussed 2002 E.U. directive lays out the 
impmiance of protecting privacy and confidentially of electronic 
communications, 140 but also allows member states to create policies that undercut 
those protections if necessary to safeguard national security and public safety, 
among other exceptions. 141 Following this pattern of allowing broad privacy 
protections to be compromised for national security purposes, case law before the 
European Court of Human Rights has made clear that privacy rights can be 
curtailed for the sake of counte1ierrorism effmis. 142 
In this patchwork of protections and compromises, various bodies within 
the European Union are attempting to react to the Snowden disclosures. Soon after 
the disclosures regarding the scope and invasiveness of GCHQ intelligence-
gathering, the European Parliament began to step up its consideration of how much 
primacy to give privacy concerns, and U.K. plaintiffs 143 began the process of 
seeking relief from surveillance and the collection of meta data from the European 
Court of Human Rights. 144 A suit currently pending queries whether Aliicle 8 of the 
ECHR has been abrogated by the actions of GCHQ. 145 
Complementing this suit is the April 2014 opinion in the Digital Rights 146 
case by the European Comi of Justice weighing the question of the retention and 
use of telecommunications metadata by intelligence agencies. The ECJ declared 
the 2006 Data Retention Directive invalid based on its concern that "by requiring 
the retention of [extensive] data and by allowing the competent national authorities 
to access those data, the directive interferes in a particularly serious manner with 
the fundamental rights to respect for private life and to the protection of personal 
data." 147 In language echoing the concerns of Judge Leon in the U.S. Klayman 
139 The United Kingdom's opt-out in these areas attempts to preserve the national autonomy that 
existed before 1999, in the pre-Treaty of Amsterdam era, in which various "pillars" of the European 
Union, including matters of security and justice, were reserved in large part for national policymakers. 
See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, Protocol 21, Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 295 (governing U.K. participation in 
EU matters pertaining to Justice and Home Affairs). Under Protocol 21, the United Kingdom has the 
right to opt-in on various EU legislation and the implementation of European Court of Justice 
decisions. /d. There is ongoing disagreement as to the scope of the protections of the Treaty of Lisbon 
and the carve-out in Protocol21 for U.K. citizens. 
140 See generally Directive 2002/58 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 July 
2002 on Privacy and Electronic Communications, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37. 
141 !d. art. 15( I). 
142 Klass v. Germany, App. No 5029/71,28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), '1f 48 (1978). 
143 Article 13 of the ECHR guarantees an effective remedy for anyone within an EC nation whose 
rights have been violated. 
144 See Steven Erlanger, Britain: Online Surveillance Challenged, N.Y. TiMES (Oct. 3, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/20 13/ I 0/04/world/europe/britain-online-surveillance-challenged.html? _FO. 
145 Big Brother Watch v. United Kingdom, App. No 58170/13, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013), 
commw1icated Jan. 9, 2014. 
146 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister for 
Communication and Kiirtner Landesregierung, 2014 O.J. (C 175) 6. 
147 Press Release, Court of Justice of the European Union, The Court of Justice declares the Data 
Retention Directive to be Invalid, (Apr. 8, 2014) (on file with the Stanford Joumal of Intemational 
Law). The ECJ noted that the type of metadata collected under Directive 2006/24/EC would allow for 
someone to know the identity of everyone with whom a particular subscriber communicates, the time 
and place of communication, and the frequency of communications between a subscriber and his/her 
contacts. This comprehensive information that can be gleaned from this mass, non-individualized 
metadata collection prompted the ECJ to find that too much precise information on the private lives of 
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decision, the ECJ made clear that the protection of privacy rights needed to increase 
along with the online presence of most individuals and the concomitant power of 
the government to surveil them. 148 
The suit pending at the European Court of Human Rights and the ECJ 
decision in the Digital Rights case offer a strong indication that supranational 
review on the surveillance regimes of member nations may yield significant 
protections for individual privacy rights. In some ways, these cases follow on ECJ 
decisions over the last several years that affirm human rights even when conflicting 
national security policies are asserted as necessary by the national governments of 
member states. 149 Yet the decision in Digital Rights may not necessarily translate 
into nullification of meta data collection and retention in individual nations, such as 
the United Kingdom, particularly given the leeway that individual member states 
have in implementing protections under the European Convention on Human 
Rights, as well as the likelihood of the intelligence community to exploit 
ambiguities in the patchwork of domestic and E.U. law and regulations. 150 
Further, we are still left with the question of whether these direct 
accountability mechanisms, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal on the domestic 
level or the availability of bringing suit before the European Comi of Human 
Rights, actually provide meaningful accountability and constraint on government 
surveillance without the existence of leaked information like that supplied by 
Snowden in 2013. These reactive mechanisms would not have been triggered 
without leaked information; combined with a permissive legislative framework for 
surveillance and the secrecy surrounding surveillance activities in the United 
Kingdom, those interested in learning more about the scope and depth of 
surveillance activities and challenging those activities may still need to rely on 
leaked information to trigger mechanisms that could help promote the rnle of law. 
B. India 
The authority of Indian intelligence agencies to conduct wanantless 
surveillance and data collection is long-standing and broad, and does not include 
effective checks-judicial or otherwise-to control against potential abuse. 
Authority for current policies of wanantless wiretapping and surveillance, like 
many of India's countelierrorism authorities, finds its roots in colonial-era 
legislation that was meant to control the Indian population and prevent possible 
subscribers was being made available in a way that impermissibly interfered with the right to respect 
for private life and the protection of personal data. ld. 
148 Scholars have described the Digital Rights decision as a milestone in its efforts to entrench, 
strengthen and constitutionalize EU-level privacy protection. See Federico Fabbrini, Human Rights in 
the Digital Age: The European Court of Justice Ruling in the Data Retention Case and its Lessons for 
Privacy and Surveillance in the U.S., 28 HARV. HUMAN RTS. J. (forthcoming 2015). 
149 See Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Kadi, AI Barakaat v. Council of the European 
Union, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351 (voiding the terrorist designation of an individual without due process); see 
also Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P, & C-595/10 P, Council, Comm'n and United Kingdom v. 
Kadi, ECLI:EU:C:2013:518 (E.C.R. Jul. 18, 2013) (finding that the process provided prior to the 
designation of an individual as a terrorist was insufficient to comport with EU human rights standards). 
150 See Governing Intelligence Symposium, Stanford Law School, May 2, 2014 (this portion of 
the symposium was held under Chatham House rules) (notes on file with author). 
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uprisings against the British colonial government. 151 The Indian Telegraph Act of 
1885 specifically authorizes the interception and storage of telegraph messages by 
the central or state govemments in times of "public emergency, or in the interest of 
the public safety" if it is deemed necessaty or expedient to do so "in the interests of 
the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations 
with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission 
of an offence." 152 This pennissive language set the stage for over a century of 
legislation, executive action, and judicial permission that enabled broad 
surveillance of all forms of telecommunications, even in peace time, so long as such 
surveillance has a security-related nexus. 
The Indian govemment has continued to focus on national security threats 
since its independence in 194 7; as such, India's legal security framework includes 
constitutional, executive, and statutory emergency powers. 153 Indian authorities also 
depend on non-emergency criminal ordinances and laws that authorize broad police 
powers that in many ways minor emergency and countertenorism-related powers. 
This conflation of various legal bases for authority---constitutional emergency 
powers, counterterrorism law, and criminal law-into one system has led to an 
extraordinary amount of power being granted to intelligence and countertenorism 
authorities 154 as long as they have articulated that their actions are being taken for 
the benefit of national security. 155 
Broad countetienorism powers, including surveillance authority, have 
incrementally increased over time. 156 In the last fifteen years, this dynamic can be 
traced both to perceived domestic intelligence failures and the shifts in the 
intemational community in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks in the 
United States. The Kargil Conflict of 1999, precipitated by the Pakistani militaty 
crossing the Line of Control 157 and involving several months of warfare between 
Pakistan and India before the restoration of the Line of Control, prompted 
151 See generally Anil Kalhan et al., Colonial Continuities: Human Rights, Terrorism, and 
Security Laws in India, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 93 (2006) (examining India's current security and 
antiterrorism laws from an historic and institutional perspective). 
152 See The Indian Telegraph Act, No. 13 of 1885, INDIA CODE (1993), § 5, available at 
http://indiacode.nic.in. 
153 See INDIA CONST. arts. 352-56, amended by Constitution (Ninety-fourth Amendment) Act, 
2006 (emergency powers provisions); see also GRANVILLE AUSTIN, WORKING A DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION: A HISTORY OF THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE 295-97 (2003) (discussing the era of 
Emergency Rule). 
154 See Sudha Setty, What's in a Name? How Nations Define Terrorism Ten Years After 9/11, 33 
U. PA. J. INT'L L. I, 48-54 (2011) (describing the circumscribed rights of defendants in terrorism 
investigations and prosecutions). 
155 See People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, A.I.R. (1997) S.C. 568, '1!'1! 5-6 
(India) (holding that the Indian Telegraph Act of 1885 authorized broad surveillance only when 
authorities were undertaking such surveillance under the circumstances of emergency or heightened 
security threat). The Supreme Court directed the government to improve procedural safeguards to 
protect against potential abuse of these authorities. I d. ,1,134-35. 
156 See Ujjwal Kumar Singh, Surveillance Regimes in ContemporaiJ' India, in Davis, supra note 
116, at 42-44. Singh cites the government's use of The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) 
Act, 1985, No. 31, Acts of Parliament, 1985 (India); The Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, No. 15, 
Acts of Parliament, 2002 (India); and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2008, No. 
35, Acts of Parliament, 2008 (India) as statutes that promote a "notion of danger that could no longer be 
contained by ordinary policing." I d. at 43. 
157 The Line of Control represents the geographic boundaries of political and military control 
between India and Pakistan in the contested Kashmir region. 
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investigation as to how the Indian intelligence community could use surveillance 
technology to act preventatively against potential military and/or terrorism 
threats. 158 The post-conflict analysis by the Kargil Review Committee noted the 
need for the Indian government to not undervalue intelligence analysis to prevent 
even an unlikely attack. 159 
The lack of ability to analyze relevant information and to share that 
information among intelligence agencies, the military, and law enforcement were 
seen as serious obstacles that needed to be resolved, 160 and the Indian government 
looked to increase its technological intelligence-gathering capabilities to improve 
the chances of forestalling another Kargil-type conflict. 161 However, the Kargil 
Review Committee observed that the cost in human and material resources required 
to "plug all conceivable loopholes to frustrate every eventuality, howsoever 
foolhardy ... would have been neither militarily nor politically cost-effective."162 
The Committee went fmiher to note that if the government were to adopt a zero-
tolerance stance toward such attacks, this would have invited legitimate criticism as 
to resource allocation and would have weakened the ability of India to defend itself 
effectively against Pakistan. 163 In the end, the post-Kargil analysis did not 
emphasize a need for greater legal authority for surveillance. Instead, the focus was 
on technological expetiise and better infonnation sharing within the government. 
Yet two years after the Kargil Conflict, the events of September 11, 2001, 
and the subsequent international pressure to strengthen domestic counterterrorism 
efforts, including surveillance, intelligence-gathering, and intelligence-sharing, led 
to significant statutory reform in India. 164 The Parliament of India passed the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (POTA) partially in response to the United 
Nations Security Council's Resolution 1373 and its global mandate to fight 
terrorism. 165 POT A laid out specific procedures for requesting the interception of 
telecommunications of tenorism suspects that required some reasonable suspicion 
158 See India Kargil Review Committee, From Swprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review 
Collmlittee Report, Executive SumiiWIJ', http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/KargilRCA.html 
(visited Feb. 19, 2014) (noting that the surprise nature of the Kargil attack highlighted the failure of 
intelligence agencies to gather the relevant information and to share it with law enforcement and 
military. The summaty concluded that "[t]here is need for greater appreciation of the role of 
intelligence and who needs it most and also more understanding with regard to who must pursue any 
given lead. It further highlights the need for closer coordination among the intelligence agencies."). 
159 The Kargil Review Committee's report notes that the Pakistani military's position in Kargil 
was, over the long term, untenable: "[The attack] was at best a political gamble, but otherwise so 
irrational and implausible as to have been virtually ruled out by the India side which was in any case 
exclusively focused on infiltration, not on intrusion or invasion. The lesson, if any, is that an irrational 
or rogue action can never be ruled out." GOV. OF INDIA, FROM SURPRISE TO RECKONING: THE KARGIL 
REVIEW COMMITTEE REPORT 22 (Sage Publishing 2000) [hereinafter Kargil Committee Repmt]. 
160 See ASHLEY J. TELLIS, C. CHRISTINE FAIR & JAMISON Jo MEDBY, LIMITED CONFLICTS 
UNDER THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA: INDIAN AND PAKISTANI LESSONS FROM THE KARGIL CRISIS 20 
(2001) (highlighting the discontent among government actors and the public with the perfmmance of 
Indian intelligence agencies). 
161 TELLIS, supra note 160, at 70--72. 
162 Kargil Committee Report, supra note 159, at 220. 
163 See id. 
164 See Setty, supra note 154, at 51-52. 
165 See V. Venkatesan, The POTA Passage, 19 FRONTLINE, Apr. 13, 2002, at 13 (noting that 
various cabinet ministers had encouraged the passage of POTA in parliamentary debates based on the 
mandate ofResolution 1373). 
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on the part of investigators. 166 When POTA was repealed in 2004 as part of a 
political pledge to deal with human rights abuses, intelligence agencies could still 
rely on the broad surveillance powers authorized by the Indian Telegraph Act of 
1885 to collect and analyze telephony and electronic data as related to security 
matters. 
The govemment expanded these powers after the November 2008 terrorist 
attacks in Mumbai, 167 when it quickly passed counte1ienorism legislation that 
broadened and made permanent the powers previously granted under POTA, as 
well as amended the Information Technology Act 2000. These amendments 
allowed for surveillance of all digital communications of all individuals within 
India, regardless of whether security threats were at issue. 168 The amendments also 
made clear that the scope of wanantless surveillance authority includes all types of 
telephony data and internet data, as distinguished from the metadata collection 
authorized by the United States and United Kingdom. 169 
By 2009, the govemment had leveraged the authority granted in 1885 and 
2008 to am10unce creation of the Central Monitoring System (CMS), a data 
collection and analysis system meant to capture all electronic data throughout 
India. 170 The parameters of this program are secret and, despite efforts to create 
privacy legislation that could work to curtail the reach of the CMS and to challenge 
the constitutionality of the CMS in court, it continues to operate without extemal 
oversight. 171 
Given the deference of the Indian judiciary with regard to national security 
initiatives and the ongoing attacks that have buoyed public suppmi for extremely 
strong counte1ienorism powers, it is unclear whether the Indian judiciary would 
find a constitutional violation in the type of surveillance authorized under the 2008 
amendment to the Information Technology Act, or that which is perhaps taking 
place under the CMS. On one hand, the Supreme Comi has previously interpreted 
Aliicle 21 of the Indian Constitution, which a1iiculates the fundamental right to life, 
as including privacy of persons and personal thought. 172 The Court has used its 
interpretation of A1iicle 21 as the basis for inferring the need for procedural 
166 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2002 (India). 
167 See Somini Sengupta & Keith Bradsher, India Faces a Reckoning as Terror Toll Eclipses 170, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2008, at AI (questioning whether Indian authorities could have prevented the 
attack with better intelligence analysis). 
168 See Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008, No. 10, Acts of Parliament, 2009 
(India) (authorizing broad data collection and analysis regardless of whether such investigation is 
related to an emergency or national security matter). 
169 Id. 
170 See Rajya Sabha, Ministry of Commc'ns & Info. Tech, Centralised System to Monitor 
Communications, PRESS INFO. BUREAU (Nov. 26, 2009, 17:50 IST), 
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=54679 (noting that the system was necessary "to strengthen 
the security environment in the country"). 
171 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, India: New Monitoring System Threatens Rights (June 7, 2013), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/20 13/06/07/india-new-monitoring-system-threatens-rights (detailing the need 
for greater transparency over the operation of the CMS and proposed privacy legislation to curb the 
reach of the CMS); see also Pranesh Prakash, Can India Trust Its Government on Privacy?, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 11, 2013 ), http:l/india.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/can-india-trust-its-govemment-on-
privacy/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=O. 
172 See Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1964) 1 S.C.R. 332 (India) (holding that the 
meaning of personal liberty as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution included a 
citizen's freedom fi·om encroachments on private life). 
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safeguards against potentially abusive and overly intmsive surveillance. 173 
However, the Indian judiciary has historically been extremely deferential to 
legislative and executive decision-making on counterterrorism matters, even when 
human rights and civil liberties are at stake, 174 making the courts a largely unreliable 
source of rights-protective constraints. 175 
IV. INCREASING REAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
The comparative analysis in the previous sections of this paper reveals 
some conunon themes: ever increasing technological capabilities of the intelligence 
community; sustained pressure to use that technology to prevent terrorist plots from 
developing; broad, conflicting, and sometimes unclear legal authorities to conduct 
massive surveillance and data collection; the intelligence community leveraging 
lack of transparency to maximize its surveillance; and the question of whether 
existing accountability measures in the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
India are sufficient to maintain the rnle of law and protect individual rights. 
Although many of the challenges in these nations are the same, the paths 
toward genuine accountability differ based on the current level of transparency, the 
types and strength of review mechanisms available, and the public support for mass 
data collection and surveillance. In India, there appears to have been a modest 
degree of transparency regarding mass data collection: The Indian public, 
politicians, and the judicimy have long understood that the Indian Telegraph Act of 
1885 authorizes such collection when the government can articulate a security 
nexus. Further, unlike the somewhat vague language of Section 215 of the Patriot 
Act, the power granted under the Information Technology (Amendment) Act of 
2008 is clear in its scope, and the Indian government itself announced the roll-out 
of the CMS. 
However, the precise scope of actual data colle9tion and surveillance 
remains murky, especially as the intelligence community's capabilities have 
increased with programs such as the CMS. It is yet to be seen whether objections to 
the intmsiveness of the CMS will resonate with Indian politicians such that 
comprehensive privacy legislation is enacted and parliamentmy oversight of 
surveillance programs is strengthened, or with the Indian judiciary such that the 
previous articulation of the right to privacy under Article 21 of the Indian 
Constitution will protect against the type of massive data collection capable under a 
fully operational CMS. In some respects, this depends on the views of the Indian 
public and the willingness of the judiciary to engage in security matters in a way 
that would break with its highly deferential past. 
In the United Kingdom, a different set of avenues for accountability exists. 
The opinion in the European Court of Justice Digital Rights case includes strong 
language on the need to dismantle systemic metadata collection and storage in order 
173 People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union oflndia, A.I.R. (1997) I S.C. C. 568 (India). 
174 See generally Mtinal Satish & Aparna Chandra, Of Matemal State and Minimalist Judicial)': 
The Indian Supreme Court's Approach to Terror-Related Adjudication, 21 NAT'L LAW ScH. OF INDIA 
REv. 51 (2009) (assessing the Indian Supreme Couti's lack of effectiveness in providing a judicial 
check on overreaching counterterr-orism policies). 
175 See Surabhi Chopra, National Security Laws in India: The Unraveling of Constitutional 
Constraints, 16 OR. REV. lNT'L L. at61-64, 73-78 (2014). 
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to preserve fundamental privacy and dignity rights of individuals. This shift, along 
with other recent movement on privacy rights, suggests institutions at the European 
level are at the forefront of protecting privacy over electronic data. However, the 
lack of transparency as to what programs are actually in place presents a knotty 
problem: If the United Kingdom continues domestic metadata collection practices 
in secret based on its interpretation that security-related policy cannot be dictated at 
the European level, is there any accountability measure in place that could forestall 
it? The domestic Investigative Powers Tribunal would not review mass collection 
if it were not brought to the attention of a complaining party. Likewise, European-
level judicial review would depend on a public understanding of the scope and type 
of surveillance at issue. Without a Snowden-like disclosure to enable such review 
or a strong commitment by the United Kingdom to abide by the human rights 
standards mticulated at the European level, parliamentary oversight would be the 
key mechanism to protect against oveneaching by the British intelligence 
community, akin to the legislative oversight stmcture in India. 
Although Congress could launch a large-scale investigation into the 
programs Snowden disclosed, like the Church Committee in its time, 176 its ability to 
serve effectively as an ongoing accountability mechanism over intelligence 
gathering in the manner of a parliament seems unlikely. For the political and 
stmctural reasons discussed above, the appamtus of national security policy-making 
is somewhat intentionally insulated from Congress. On the one hand, the benefit of 
this structural arrangement is that it may facilitate expertise and efficient decision-
making, but a key effect is also that this apparatus is not really accessible to the 
other branches of government or the public. 177 This consolidation of decision-
making authority in the executive branch, plus the difference between congressional 
and parliamentary access to executive branch information, accounts for a different 
potential for legislative oversight in the United States as compared to the United 
Kingdom and India. Fmther, the lack of widespread and sustained public pressure 
176 See Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., Why We Need a New Church Committee to Fix Our Broken 
Intelligence System, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Mar. 12, 2014), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/why-we-need-new-church-committee-fix-our-broken-
intelligence-system. Schwarz, who served as chief counsel to the Church Committee, argues that the 
type of deep, wide-access investigation that the Church Committee undertook served the purposes of 
uncovering illegal government behavior, increasing self-policing and the inculcation of best practices 
among government agencies, and restoring public confidence in the government as being bound by 
laws. /d. Senator Frank Church, chair of the Church Committee, recognized the inability to maintain 
accountability over NSA activities fi·om within the administration: 
"[The NSA's] capability at any time could be turned around on the American people, and no 
American would have any privacy left, such [is] the capability to monitor everything: telephone 
conversations, telegrams, it doesn't matter. There would be no place to hide .... I know the 
capacity that is there to make tyranny total in America, and we must see to it that this agency and 
all agencies that possess this technology operate within the law and under proper supervision, so 
that we never cross over that abyss. That is the abyss from which there is no return." 
See James Bamford, The Agency That Could Be Big Brother, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/25/weekinreview/25bamford.html?pagewanted=all&_t=l& (quoting 
Senator Frank Church from statements made in 1975). 
177 See generally Aziz Rana, Who Decides on Security?, 44 CoNN. L. REV. 1417 (2012) (arguing 
that the process of national security decision making has been narrowed inappropriately to experts 
within the executive branch). 
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on Congress178 toward reform suggests that a meaningful increase in legislative 
oversight of the intelligence community will not occur in the near future. 
Leaks like that of Snowden, combined with rigorous and responsible press 
coverage, can provide some level of constraint on and accountability over 
intelligence community activity. 179 However, the tendency toward public inertia 
and the possibility that democratic institutions will not actually provide a 
substantive check on the surveillance apparatus 180 suggest weakness in relying 
solely on this approach. Further, the crackdown on leaking and the treatment of 
whistleblowers as criminals, even prior to Snowden's disclosures, 181 combined with 
heightened security measures, means that reliance on leaking as a meaningful 
structural check is misplaced. 
Tinkering with the structure inside of the NSA also seems to achieve more 
in terms of burnishing a veneer of accountability rather than creating genuine 
oversight. It is hard to understand how various proposed reforms, such as 
appointing a civilian to oversee the NSA 182 or creating a more adversarial internal 
review process within the NSA, 183 would increase accountability and transparency. 
For the executive branch, it seems more likely that pressure from business and 
corporate interests trying to retain consumer business 184 may shape NSA parameters 
for mass data collection and domestic surveillance in some respects, 185 but will 
178 Some have argued that public pressure on Congress and the executive branch can itself 
constitute a constraint on intelligence community activity. See generally JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER 
AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 205--43 (2012) (arguing that an 
internal oversight process, an active press, leaked information that energized public critique, and other 
factors created a "presidential synopticon" that effectively restrained executive branch decision-
making). Some challenged Professor Goldsmith's argument on grounds that it did not provide a 
structural, reliable, ex ante constraint on executive power. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Stochastic 
Constraint, 126 HARV. L. REV. 990 (2013) (finding the ex post constraints offered by Goldsmith to be 
lacking in effectiveness and constitutional structural integrity); cf Jack Goldsmith, A Reply to Professor 
Katyal, HARv. L. REv. F. (Feb. 2013), 
http://www.harvardlawreview. org/issues/ 126/february 13/forum_l 004.php# _ftnrefl6 (defending his 
original thesis on the grounds that such informal ex post constraints were anticipated and understood by 
the framers of the U.S. Constitution). 
179 See generally Sagar, supra note I 07. 
180 See Glennon, supra note 26, at 13-15. 
181 See Sue Halpern, Partial Disclosure, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS (July 10, 2014), 
http://www. nybooks.com/ articles/ archives/20 14/jul/ 1 0/glenn-greenwald-partial-disclosure/. Halpern 
offers some detail on how NSA whistleblowers from several years prior to Snowden's disclosures did 
not have their concerns taken seriously but were subjected to FBI interrogation, searches of their 
homes, and/or threats of prosecution. As such, Halpern argues, Snowden acted as he did after being 
"[ s ]tymied by an unresponsive bureaucracy, seeing the fate of earlier NSA whistleblowers, and finding 
no adequate provisions within the system to challenge the legality of government activity if that activity 
was considered by the government to touch on national security." !d. 
182 See Spencer Ackerman, White House Considers Appointing Civilian NSA Chief amid Calls for 
Reform, GUARDIAN (Nov. II, 2013, 12:39 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/11/white-house-nsa-civilian-director-refmm. 
183 See Fox News, Capitol Hill Republicans Disagree on Future of NSA Spying, King Attacks 
Paul, Fox NEWS (Aug. 18, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/08/18/capitol-hill-
republicans-disagree-future-nsa-spying-king-attacks-paul/ (arguing that there are "no repercussions" 
when there is no external review of such programs). 
184 E.g., Claire Cain Miller, AngiJ' Over U.S. Surveillance, Tech Giants Bolster Defenses, N.Y. 
TIMES 
(Oct. 31, 20 13), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/01/technology/angry-over-us-surveillance-tech-
giants-bolster-defenses.html?hp&_t=O. 
185 Simultaneously, private companies have stepped up efforts to prevent law enforcement and 
intelligence community access to customer data and transmissions in an effort to reassure customers as 
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likely not lead to institutional or stmctural changes as to the government's approach 
to surveillance without additional pressure from the public. 
One promising move with regard to oversight and transparency has been 
the establishment and staffing of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board 
(PCLOB). 186 This board, tasked with assessing many aspects of the government's 
national security apparatus both for efficacy and for potentially unnecessary 
incursions into civil liberties, has a broad mandate and, compared with many 
national security decision makers, significant independence from the executive 
branch. 187 Retrospectively, the PCLOB has, among other things, issued the highly 
critical report of the NSA Metadata Program in January 2014 that led to further 
public pressure on the Obama administration to curtail this program; it is promising 
that the PCLOB's prospective agenda includes futther analysis of various 
surveillance programs. 188 However, the PCLOB's potential influence in protecting 
civil rights may be limited by its position: The PCLOB is an advisory body that 
analyzes existing and proposed programs and possibly recommends changes, but it 
cannot mandate that those changes be implemented. The ability to have a high 
level of access to information surrounding counterterrorism surveillance programs 
and to recommend changes in such programs is important and should be lauded, but 
over-reliance on the PCLOB's non-binding advice to the intelligence community to 
somehow solve the accountability and transparency gap with regard to these 
programs would be a mistake. 
For example, on prospective matters, it is likely that intelligence agencies 
would consult the PCLOB only if the agency itself considers the issue being faced 
new or novel, as the NSA metadata program was labeled prior to its inception. In 
such cases, decision makers within an agency generally ask whether the 
contemplated program is useful or necessary, technologically feasible, and legal. If 
all three questions are answered affirmatively, the program can be implemented. 
Now that the PCLOB is fully operational, it seems likely that if a contemplated 
program is considered new or novel, an intelligence agency would consult the 
PCLOB at some stage of this process for its guidance on implementing the 
program. This nonpattisan external input may improve self-policing within the 
to their privacy, an effort that has prompted law enforcement and intelligence community concems in 
the United States and elsewhere. See Brian Naylor, Apply Says iDS Encryption Protects Privacy; FBI 
Raises Crime Fears, NPR (Oct. 8, 2014 at 5:17 PM), 
http:/ /www.npr .org/blogs/alltechconsidered/20 14/1 0/08/354598527 /apple-says-ios-encryption-protects-
privacy-fbi-raises-crime-fears (detailing ways in which Apple's operating system prevents warrantless 
searches of data kept on a smatiphone, and the FBI's constemation at this technology); Robert 
Hannigan, The Web Is a Terrorist's Command-and-Control Network of Choice, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 3, 
2014 at 6:03 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/c89b6c58-6342-lle4-8a63-
00144feabdcO.html#axzz3I5nuL36a (opinion of the head of GCHQ as to how terrorists can exploit 
social media and intemet sites maintained by U.S. companies). 
186 Establishing the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) was a recommendation 
of the 9/11 Commission Report. The PCLOB was statutorily authorized in 2007, but only became 
operational and fully staffed in late 2013 and early 2014, months after the Snowden disclosures. See 
GARRETT HATCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34385, PRIVACY AND CIVIL LiBERTIES OVERSIGHT 
BOARD: NEW INDEPENDENT AGENCY STATUS (2012) (describing the establishment of the PCLOB). 
187 See Michael J. Glennon, National Security and Double Govemment, 5 HARV. NAT'L 
SECURITY J. 1, 9 (2014) (listing the numerous national security officials who served in multiple posts in 
both Republican and Democratic administrations). 
188 See PCLOB Announces Its Short-Term Agenda, PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT 
BD. (Aug. 7, 2014), available at http://www.pclob.gov/newsroom/20140807.html (including 
assessment ofE.O. 12,333 and other surveillance authorities). 
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intelligence community and help intelligence agencies avoid implementing 
controversial programs or, even if implemented, set better parameters around new 
programs. 189 
If the PCLOB is able to exert some degree of soft power in influencing 
national security decision-making, then the judicimy represents hard power that 
could be used to force the protection of civil liberties where it might not othetwise 
occur. The FISC should be reformed to include a public advocate lobbying on 
behalf of privacy concerns, making the process genuinely adversarial and 
strengthening the FISC against charges that it merely rubber stamps applications 
from the intelligence community. 190 Article III courts need to follow the lead of 
Judge Leon in Klayman in conceptualizing privacy as broad and defensible, even in 
a world where electronics-based communication is dominant and relatively easy for 
the government to collect. If the judicial defense of privacy were combined with 
the possibility of liability for violations of that privacy, it is likely that this would 
incentivize increased self-policing among the members of the intelligence 
community. The creation of an active PCLOB and a more adversarial process 
before the FISC will not provide a perfect solution to the dilemmas posed by the 
government's legitimate need for secrecy and the protection of the public against 
potential abuse. Yet because these changes are institutional and structural, they are 
well-placed to improve the dynamic between the intelligence community, oversight 
mechanisms, and the public. 
CONCLUSION 
Genuine accountability should not depend on the chance that an 
unauthorized and illegal leak will occur. In the comparative example of the United 
Kingdom, engagement with a European Union energized with a commitment to 
increase privacy protections, along with domestic parliamentary oversight, provide 
two potential avenues for increased constraint on surveillance. In India, the 
parliament and the courts historically enabled, not constrained, the intelligence 
community. Whether that stance will continue as the government's technological 
capabilities increase is yet to be seen. 
Domestically, it could be argued that the types of reform recommended 
here to improve actual accountability and transparency over programs like the NSA 
Metadata Program are overkill: They involve multiple branches of government, the 
PCLOB, and the public. However, much of the accountability apparatus that has 
been in place was dormant until the Snowden disclosures, and would have remained 
passive without those disclosures. A multi-faceted, long-term, structural approach 
189 In other national security contexts, it is clear that government officials would refuse to engage 
in potentially illegal behavior without the "golden shield" of protection against civil and criminal 
liability. See Sudha Setty, No Nfore Secret Laws: How Transparency of Executive Branch Legal Policy 
Doesn't Let the Terrorists Win, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 579, 604 (2009) (describing how CIA inte!1'ogators 
required comfmi letters from the Office of Legal Counsel protecting them against liability before 
engaging in the torture of detainees); see also Glennon, supra note 26, at 78 (President Bush's 
decisions with regard to initiating and suspending metadata collection were dependent on Office of 
Legal Counsel guidance at the time). 
190 See ANDREW NOLAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43260, REFORM OF THE FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURTS: INTRODUCING A PUBLIC ADVOCATE (2014) (describing the 
constitutional and other parameters that would be considered in establishing a FISC public advocate). 
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to improving transparency and accountability--one that involves at a minimum the 
courts and the PCLOB, but hopefully Congress, the executive branch, and the 
public as well-improves the likelihood of sustained and meaningful accountability 
as new surveillance capabilities are developed and implemented. 
